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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,

:
:

v.

:

ANTHONY JAMES VALDEZ,

:

Case No. 20040633-SC

:

Respondent is incarcerated.

Defendant/Respondent.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court granted the State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals in State v. Valdez. 2004 UT App 214, 95 P.3d 291, cert, granted. 106 P.3d 743
(Utah 2004). See Order dated November 5, 2004. The court of appeals' opinion in
Valdez is attached hereto as Addendum A. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue I: "Whether a Batson challenge may be deemed timely if the jury has been
sworn and the remainder of the venire excused." Order dated November 5, 2004.
Issue II: "Whether the court of appeals applied the correct criteria for a Batson
analysis and the correct standard of review on appeal." Id.
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of
appeals and not that of the district court." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,^25, 63 P.3d
650 (quotation and citation omitted). This Court reviews "the decision of the court of

appeals for correctness.11 IdL (quotation and citation omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and rule 18 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure are determinative of this appeal. See Addendum B.

STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS *
Anthony James Valdez (Valdez) was charged with one count each of aggravated
burglary, possession of a firearm by a restricted person, aggravated assault, child abuse,
and criminal mischief. Valdez. 2004 UT App 214 at Tfl;R. 2-4; 35-38. On October 29,
2002, the trial court conducted voir dire to select a jury for Valdez's trial. Valdez. 2004
UT App 214 at ^|2; R. 94; 209. The venire consisted of eleven men and fourteen women.
R. 94. Each venireperson had at least a high school education. R. 209:10-32. Eight men
and nine women were or had been married; five men and twelve women had children;
five men and eleven women subscribed to a newspaper; o ne woman subscribed to a
hunting magazine; one man and two women subscribed to Sports Illustrated; two men
and one woman subscribed to outdoors magazines; eight men and eleven women were
employed; and three men and five women enjoyed outdoor activities. IdL Four women
had heard of the case. IdL at 34-35. Of these four women, one served on the jury, one
was struck for cause, and two were struck by the State. R. 94.

1

The underlying facts of this case are not relevant to determining the issues on
certiorari review. See Pet. Br. at 9.
2

Lynda Valerio (Valerio) responded to the questionnaire by saying:
I'm an office manager for a nonprofit agency called the
[Brain] Injury Association of Utah. I also train individuals
with sustained brain injuries to return to employment.
I have a high school education with some trade
schooling classes that I've taken. My husband's name is
Chris. He is a customer service representative with a cell
phone company here in Salt Lake. We have two children,
one will be five in two weeks and a daughter that is 16
months old. My husband gets Sports Illustrated and that's the
only magazine or newspaper we get. Hobbies, I enjoy
camping and any outdoor activities, any crafts, ceramics and
things like that.
R. 209:14-15. Responding to the trial court's questions about the nonprofit agency,
Valerio said "We apply for grants so that we can provide services for these individuals
but we are the only agency brain injury association in the state of Utah, so we serve the
whole state for resources"; "If an individual is in need of housing, medical assistance,
anything like that, we do refer them out to professionals that can help them"; and "[W]e
help them to get connected with independent living skills." IcL_ at 15-16.
Joyce Gonzalez (Gonzalez) responded to the questionnaire by saying:
I'm trying to retire as housekeeping. And I have a high
school level education. And my spouse's name is Jessie and
he retired from Hercules. And I have three children, 45, 43
and 41, a daughter and two sons. And we take the Tribune
and just craft magazines. And my hobbies, we have a cabin
at Scofield Reservoir that takes up a lot of our time in the
summer, and my grandchildren.
Id at 18-19. Responding to the court's questions, Gonzalez said she had four
grandchildren and she "clean[ed] houses for [her] children" but was trying to quit. IcL. at
3

19. Gonzalez was questioned in chambers because she said she had heard of the case. R.
209:65. Defense counsel asked her what she remembered. Id_ Gonzalez remembered
"hearing about the break-in in the area," and asked, "Was it Ensign Avenue?" Id,
Defense counsel responded, "Emery Street." Id. Gonzalez said, "Emery Street? It's just
very vague because I just remember the name and the incident." Id. at 66. Next, defense
counsel asked, "That's all you remember is that there was a break-in?" Id^ Gonzalez
responded, "Exactly, yeah." Id Then defense counsel asked, "Are you sure that it's this
incident we're talking about?" Id. Gonzalez said, "I think it is. Like I say, I read the
newspaper every day, and it just sounded familiar to me." Id. Finally, the trial court
asked, "Do you believe that you could . .. just weigh what is presented to you in court?"
Id. Gonzalez responded, "I think I could, uh-huh." Id.
Tamara Thornton (Thornton) responded to the questionnaire as follows:
I work at Thornton Plumbing and Heating, I've worked there
about 20 years and I do payroll and benefits. Two years of
college. My husband's name is Clay and he is an owner at
Thornton Plumbing and Heating. We have three children, 20,
17 and 13. Deseret News comes to our home and Popular
Science and such like that. Hobbies, I enjoy reading and take
Irish folk dancing classes, things like that.
R. 209:14. Responding to the trial court's questions, Thornton explained Irish folk
dancing is "like river dance but I'm just a beginner, so I'm not going to do any
demonstrations"; the family business has "58 employees" and is "a third-generation
company"; and the family business is "usually a subcontractor" with a "specialty" in "the

4

radiant." IdL When asked about prior jury service, Thornton said she had served on a
criminal case eight years ago where the jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter.
Id. at 49-50. The trial court asked, "Anything about that experience you believe would
affectyour ability to serve on this jury?" Id. at 50. Thornton answered, "No." Id_ Later,
Thornton was questioned in chambers because she said she had heard about the case. IcL
at 58. Defense counsel asked, "What do you remember hearing?" IdL Thornton replied,
"I don't have a real strong memory of it, I just vaguely remember the name seemed
familiar and that there was an individual broke into a home, and I just really don't
remember a lot about it." Id Next, defense counsel asked, "Are you sure that this case
was the one you're thinking about in the news?" Id. Thornton answered, "I guess I'm not
100 percent sure." IcL Then, the trial court asked if she "would have any problem with
weighing only the matters you hear in court?" IdL at 59. Thornton replied, "No." Id.
Paula Morely (Morely) responded to the questionnaire by saying:
I work part time for Jordan School District and I give piano
lessons in my home. I have a college degree, a bachelor's.
My spouse's name is Russell, he is a store manager for the
Deseret Book Company. We have five children, one of
whom is deceased. The others are 23, 20, 16 and 14 years
old. We take the Readers Digest and the Deseret News at our
home and Sports Illustrated for the boys. My hobbies include
music, baking[,] outdoors things with my family, camping
and going to football games and things.
R. 209:27. Responding to the trial court's questions, Morely said she watched "BYU"
football, and worked in "a federal program to help boost the reading and math levels" in

5

a "computer lab" in "an elementary school." IcL at 27-28.
In chambers, defense counsel asked venireperson Peggy Curtis (Curtis), "You said
you may have heard this case in the news?" Id at 61. Curtis replied:
Like I said, I read the newspaper quite thoroughly but, again,
I don't remember details. I do remember- . . . when you were
reading over the charges it seemed in my mind I remembered
something about with the child abuse. It seems like there
wasn't an abuse on the child but the child was present or
something when there was some alleged abuse of a mother or
a female or something.... Again, I don't remember
anything, you know, other than that kind of-because I guess I
remember thinking, yeah, it's a first time I guess . . . thinking
that child abuse can be something that the child endures
visually or something as opposed to the physical.
Id. The trial court asked Curtis if she could weigh only evidence "that comes in during
the court proceeding," and Curtis responded, "I believe I can, yes." Id. at 61-62. The
trial court struck six venirepersons for cause, leaving eight men and eleven women. R.
94. The State then used its four peremptory challenges to strike four women: Valerio,
Gonzalez, Thornton, and Morely. IcL Curtis served on the jury. IcL
Following jury selection, Valdez objected to the State's use of its peremptory
challenges under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at
Tf2; R. 209:78. In order to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination under
Batson, Valdez's counsel noted that the State used all four of its peremptory strikes to
exclude women from the jury. IcL In response, the "State did not argue that Valdez had
failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination, but instead argued Valdez's Batson

6

challenge was untimely." Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at Tf3;R. 209:78. Without
addressing timeliness, the trial court ordered the State to explain its challenges. Id. The
State explained its challenges as follows:
The State chose to strike Ms. Valerio because she stated that
she worked for a nonprofit brain injury type of place. That is
not a basis upon which to strike her [for cause], but I felt her
responses lined up in a way that would make her not a helpful
[juror] for the State and that she would be somewhat overly
compassionate.
The second [juror] was Ms. Gonzalez. She had heard
of the case and seemed — though she said that it wouldn't
bother her, her responses to me seemed matter of fact and I
felt like her responses would not make her a good juror for
the State.
Ms. Thornton had also heard of the case and I don't
recall what it was, there was something that I immediately
decided that I would make her one of my strikes. She'd also
been on a jury and he was found guilty of a manslaughter,
which I thought was probably a one-step reduction, at least
that's the assumption. So again, I felt like she was not going
to be a helpful one for the State.
The last one I agonized over whether to strike, No. 19,
Paula Morely or 21 Ron Hardy, I conferred with my
colleague,... and we talked about it and she brought to my
attention he was a hunter and that she felt like a hunter would
know things about guns and brought that point about that
potential juror and another one. And after conferring with
her I changed my mind and went with [her] — and that was
simply — she was simply towards the end. I suppose there
was also it felt like she was not strong, not — I'm sorry, I'm
trying to read my notes here.. ..
There was this pattern of « her responses made me
think she would be somebody, again, that might be willing to
let bygones be bygones, what I would say overly
compassionate, and it was just based on her responses about
position, her responses to little subtle things like her teaching
piano lessons and the magazines she chose. We don't have a
7

lot to base these things on, so that's how I made those
choices.
Valdez. 2004 UT App 214 at 1J3 (quoting R. 209:79-80) (first alteration in original). The
trial court accepted the State's explanations and overruled Valdez's objection. Valdez .
2004 UT App 214 at P ; R. 209:80; see. Addendum C.
"During the jury trial, the victim recanted her accusation against Valdez." Valdez .
2004 UT App 214 at f l ; R. 210:55-79. "The State called an expert in Battered Women
Syndrom[e] (BWS) to explain why many victims of abuse recant their accusation against
their abuser." Valdez. 2004 UT App 214 at ^4; R. 211:100-109. "Valdez objected to the
testimony, but the district court overruled the objection." Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at
1J4; R. 59-62; 80-83; 147-64; 208. "The jury found Valdez guilty of aggravated burglary,
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, and criminal mischief."
Valdez. 2004 UT App 214 at ^[4; R. 133-35; 138-46. On January 13, 2003, the trial court
sentenced Valdez to consecutive terms of five years to life in prison for aggravated
burglary, and one to fifteen years in prison for possession of a firearm. R. 179-80. The
trial court also sentenced Valdez to six months in jail for criminal mischief. Id. Valdez
filed a notice of appeal on January 30, 2003. R. 184-85.
On appeal, Valdez challenged the trial court's "ruling that the State offered
nondiscriminatory reasons for its use of peremptory strikes." Valdez, 2004 UT App 214
at Tf5. In response, the State argued Valdez's Batson challenge was procedurally barred
because it was not timely or preserved. Id at ^ 7 , 12. On the merits, the State conceded
8

step one of the Batson test, but challenged steps two and three. Id. at ^[19-20. The court
of appeals rejected the State's procedural claims. Id_ at Tfl[5-13. First, it rejected the
timeliness claim because rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure "allows Batson
challenges . . . 'before any of the evidence is presented"1 if the court finds good cause.
IcL at ^jl 1 (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(2)). Here, the trial court implicitly found good
cause by "ignoring the State's timeliness argument and requiring the parties to proceed
directly to arguments on the merits." Id at ^{10 (citing State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769,
776 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991)). Second, the court rejected
the preservation claim because "there is no clear rule [in Utah] requiring a defendant to
renew a Batson objection." Id. at ^[13. "Rather, Utah courts do 'not require a party to
continue to object once a motion has been made, and the trial court has rendered a
decision on the issue.'" Id (quoting State v. Hoffhine. 2001 UT 4,Tfl4, 20 P.3d 265).
The court of appeals then observed that the State conceded step one of the Batson
test and decided the merits under step two. Id. at ^[20-30. Initially, the court determined
the correct standard of review for step two is abuse of discretion because step two "seems
less like a factual issue because the trial court does not weigh evidence, but instead looks
to the face of the State's explanations," and the "trial court's examination of the facial
neutrality of the State's explanation also considers the general context of the case and the
specific issues involved." Id. at ^[17 (citations omitted). Thus, "because each case may
turn on different issues, or even subtly different nuances," the trial court must be allowed

9

"discretion." IcL at TJ15. Applying this standard, the court of appeals held step two was
not met. I d at ^26. The court of appeals analyzed step two by considering whether the
prosecutor's explanations were "'"(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear
and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate."5" Id at «|21 (citing State v. Cannon, 2002
UT App 18,TJ9, 41 P.3d 1153). Specifically, the court held the State's explanation that it
struck "Jurors Morely and Valerio" because they were "'overly compassionate"1 and
Gonzalez because she "was 'matter of fact,'" was "not reasonably clear and specific." IcL
at ^[26-27. This failure was "sufficient in itself to reverse the trial court's treatment of
the State's peremptory strike." IdL at ^27. The court of appeals also noted the State's
explanations "were unrelated to the case" and were not legitimate. IcL at ^[28-29.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm because Utah law says a Batson challenge may be
deemed timely if raised after the jury has been sworn and the remainder of the venire
excused. Whether a Batson objection is timely depends on local practices. The local
practice in Utah says a defendant must raise a Batson objection before the jury is sworn
or, for good cause, before any of the evidence is presented, and a trial court implicitly
finds good cause by allowing counsel to proceed with their Batson arguments and ruling
on the merits. In this case, the court of appeals correctly applied the local practice.
Next, this Court should affirm because the court of appeals applied the correct
criteria for each step of Batson's test. First, the court of appeals applied the correct

10

criteria for step one. The State concedes it waived the issue of whether Valdez made a
prima facie showing. Second, the court of appeals applied the correct criteria for step
two. The Supreme Court has said a step two explanation need not be persuasive, but
must be facially neutral, legitimate, clear and reasonably specific, and related to the case
to be tried ("Batson's step two requirements"). Following this guidance, the court of
appeals held the step two explanation need not be persuasive, but must meet Batson 's
step two requirements. Third, the court of appeals correctly declined to proceed to step
three. This Court should not address this issue because it is not part of the issue on
certiorari. Regardless, this Court should affirm because the court of appeals correctly
held the State's explanations did not satisfy step two. Fourth, even if the court of appeals
applied the incorrect criteria for a step two analysis, it would have reached the same
conclusion under step three. Under step two, the court of appeals reviewed the trial
court's ruling for an abuse of discretion. Had the court of appeals proceeded to step
three and applied a clearly erroneous standard, it would have conducted a similar analysis
and reached the same conclusion.
Finally, this Court should affirm because the court of appeals applied the correct
standards of review. First, the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review to
step one. Following this Court's guidance, the court of appeals reviewed step one for
abuse of discretion. Second, the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review
to step two. Step two requires a trial court to look to the face of the State's explanation,
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and consider the general context of the case and the specific issues involved. Thus, it is a
mixed question of fact and law and should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Third,
the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review to step three. This Court and
the Supreme Court have held step three is reviewed for clear error. Following this case
law, the court of appeals held step three is reviewed for clear error.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM BECAUSE UTAH LAW SAYS A
BATSON CHALLENGE MAY BE DEEMED TIMELY IF RAISED
AFTER THE JURY HAS BEEN SWORN AND THE REMAINDER
OF THE VENIRE EXCUSED

Under Batson, an objection to a peremptory strike must be timely to preserve the
issue for appeal. See Batson. 476 U.S. at 99-100 (allowing local timeliness rules to bar
Batson challenges); Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (stating, in context ofBatson challenge, "[i]t is axiomatic that, before a party may
advance an issue on appeal, the record must clearly show that it was timely presented to
the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon" (citation omitted));
Vaklez, 2004 UT App 214 at ^7. "Issues not raised in the trial court in a timely fashion
are deemed waived, precluding this court from considering their merits on appeal."
Cadston, 776 P.2d at 655; see Valdez 2004 UT App 214 at ^[7.
Whether a defendant's Batson objection is timely depends entirely on "local
practices." Ford v. Georgia. 498 U.S. 411, 423 (1991) (citing Batson. 476 U.S. at 99
n.24); see Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at \I. A "state court may adopt a general rule that a
12

Batson claim is untimely if it is raised for the first time on appeal, or after the jury is
sworn, or before its members are selected." Ford, 498 U.S. at 423. However, a state may
not use its rule to declare a Batson issue waived unless the rule is a "firmly established
and regularly followed state practice." James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348-51 (1984);
see Ford, 498 U.S. at 424 (holding court cannot prevent review of Batson claim by
applying "rule unannounced at the time of petitioner's trial"); Barr v. Columbia, 378 U.S.
146, 149 (1964) (holding state rules "not strictly or regularly followed" may not bar
review); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 457-58 (1958) ("Novelty in procedural
requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this Court applied for by those
who, in justified reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their
federal constitutional rights."); Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at ^|13. For example, in
NAACP, the Supreme Court declined to apply a state rule that would have prevented
review of a due process claim, even though the state rule appeared "in retrospect to form
part of a consistent pattern of procedures," because the defendant could not be "deemed
to have been apprised of [the rule's] existence." NAACP, 357 U.S. at 457.
In Utah, the firmly-established and regularly-followed rule for determining the
timeliness of aBatson objection is rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See
Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776 (holding rule 18 is applicable to "constitutionally-grounded
objections] to the State's peremptory challenges"); Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at ^[9.
Rule 18 says, "A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is
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sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after
the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented." Utah R. Crim. P.
18(c)(2). The only Utah case directly discussing the timeliness of Batson objections is
Harrison. See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776. In Harrison, the defendant objected
immediately after the jury was sworn. IcL In response, the trial court asked the
prosecutor to explain its peremptory strikes, accepted the prosecutor's explanation, and
overruled the defendant's objection. Id. On appeal, the court of appeals held the
defendant's objection was timely under rule 18 because the defendant objected before
any evidence was presented and the trial court made an implicit finding of good cause by
"allowing counsel to proceed with their arguments." Id. Utah's other Batson cases,
while not directly addressing timeliness, also comport with rule 18. See State v.
Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363,^}3, 58 P.3d 867 (reaching merits where Batson objection not
raised until after jury sworn); Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 (same); Cariston, 776 P.2d at
655 (holding Batson objection waived because defendant did not object "until after the
return of an adverse verdict"); Addendum D.
Thus, rule 18 as interpreted by Harrison, creates the following timeliness rule for
Batson objections in Utah. A defendant must raise his Batson objection before the jury is
sworn or, for good cause, before any of the evidence is presented. Utah R. Crim. P.
18(c)(2). A trial court implicitly finds good cause by allowing counsel to proceed with
their Batson arguments and ruling on the merits of the Batson claim. Harrison, 805 P.2d
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at 776. Because this rule represents Utah's only guidance for determining the timeliness
of a Batson objection, it is the rule that should be applied to determine the timeliness of
Valdez's Batson objection. See Ford, 498 U.S. at 424 (holding court cannot prevent
review of Batson claim by applying "rule unannounced at the time of petitioner's trial").
Moreover, rule 18 as interpreted by Harrison, is an appropriate rule for
determining the timeliness of Batson objections because it comports with Supreme Court
case law and Utah's general preservation requirement. First, the Supreme Court has said
a "state court may adopt a general rule that a Batson claim is untimely if it is raised for
the first time on appeal, or after the jury is sworn, or before its members are selected."
Ford, 498 U.S. at 423. Rule 18 falls directly within these boundaries. See. Utah R. Crim.
P. 18(c)(2). The Supreme Court has also said, "The fact that the [trial] court reviewed
petitioner's [Batson] claim on the merits .. . presupposes the claim's timeliness." Ford,
498 U.S. at 421. This supports Harrison's holding that a trial court implicitly finds good
cause by allowing counsel to proceed with their Batson arguments and ruling on the
merits of the Batson claim. See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776.
Second, Utah's general preservation requirement exists because "the trial court
ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct
it," and "a defendant should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the
strategy of enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy
fails,... claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse." State v. Hoi gate, 2000 UT
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74/fll 1, 10 P.3d 346 (quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Thus, an
issue is preserved if "'"it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an
opportunity to rule on the issue.'"" Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125,
129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted). Like Utah's general preservation
requirement, rule 18 assures that a trial court will be given the opportunity to address a
claimed Batson error and that a defendant cannot strategically hide a Batson objection to
enhance his chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails, claim error on appeal.
See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776 (noting Batson claim, raised eifter jury sworn, was timely
because defendant "met the requirement of raising and obtaining a ruling on his
constitutional objection in the trial court, to preserve it for appeal" (citation omitted)).
In this case, the court of appeals correctly applied Utah's timeliness rule and held
Valdez's objection was timely. Valdez's Batson objection complied with rule 18 as
interpreted by Harrison. SeeValdez, 2004 UT App 214 at 1fl[7-ll; R. 209:78. Valdez
objected to the State's peremptory strikes "before any of the evidence [was] presented."
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(2); see R. 209:78. Then, as in Harrison, the trial court implicitly
found good cause "by allowing counsel to proceed with their arguments" and ruling on
the merits of Valdez's objection. Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776; see Ford, 498 U.S. at 421
(holding "fact that the [trial] court reviewed petitioner's [Batson] claim on the merits . . .
presupposes the claim's timeliness"); R. 209:78. Thus, the court of appeals correctly
held Valdez's objection was timely. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at t l 1 ("Thus, in the

16

absence of any firmer and more established authority on the subject, we could not
prevent appellate review of Valdez's constitutional claim due to lack of timeliness."). To
hold otherwise would have impermissibly denied Valdez review of his Batson objection.
See Ford. 498 U.S. at 424. Moreover, by complying with rule 18 as interpreted by
Harrison. Valdez satisfied Utah's general preservation requirement because his objection
allowed the trial court to rule on the Batson issue, and prevented him from strategically
hiding his Batson challenge to enhance his chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy
failed, claiming error on appeal. See Holgate. 2000 UT 74 at^fll; R. 209:78.
In its opening brief, the State concedes that the court of appeals was bound to
follow Utah's "procedural practice" when deciding the timeliness of Valdez's objection.
Pet. Br. at 12-13. It complains, however, that no other jurisdictions allow Batson
objections "after the trial jury is sworn and the remainder of the venire excused." IcL_ at
13 (citations omitted). Contrary to the State's claim, other jurisdictions can and do allow
Batson objections after the jury is sworn. See, e.g.. Ford. 498 U.S. at 423 (holding "state
court may adopt a general rule that a Batson claim is untimely if it is raised for the first
time on appeal, or after the jury is sworn, or before its members are selected"); Lewis v.
Commonwealth. 492 S.E.2d 492, 493 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (holding local rule "allows a
Batson motion to be made after the jury is sworn, but only with leave of court").
Besides, it does not matter what procedural practice other jurisdictions engage in. See
James. 466 U.S. at 348-51. In Utah, the only firmly-established timeliness rule for
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Batson objections is rule 18 as interpreted by Harrison. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(2);
Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776. Thus, the court of appeals correctly based its timeliness ruling
on rule 18 as interpreted by Harrison, and left a possible change in Utah's timeliness rule
to "be addressed by an amendment to the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." Valdez,
2004UTApp214at^|ll&n.l.
The State also argues the court of appeals erred by applying rule 18 to Valdez's
Batson objection because rule 18 is "not controlling." Pet. Br. at 19. First, the State
claims rule 18 is not controlling because it "imposes the time limit for challenging the
retention of a juror," not "an objection to the removal of a juror." Id. (emphasis in
original). The State's argument is without distinction. Rule 18 governs when a
peremptory strike can be made. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(2). A Batson objection
challenges a peremptory strike and, accordingly, cannot be made until after the
peremptory strike has been made. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 82. Thus, Batson objections,
like peremptory strikes, are permitted "for good cause" at any time "after the juror is
sworn but before any of the evidence is presented." Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(2).
Second, the State claims that Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-16(1) (2002), rather than
rule 18, is controlling. Pet. Br. at 18. This Court should decline to consider this
argument because the State did not raise the argument before either lower court or in its
petition for a writ of certiorari. See Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4) ("Only the questions set
forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme Court.");
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Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48,ffi[12-16, 48 P.3d 968
(declining to review issue on certiorari unless properly preserved for appeal); State v.
Cram, 2002 UT 37,TJ6, 46 P.3d 230 (same); Thurston v. Box Elder County , 892 P.2d
1034, 1037 n.2 (Utah 1995) (noting "lower court ruling becomes binding on a higher
court through failure of the parties to preserve an issue for review" (citations omitted)).
Besides, by its own concessions, this argument fails. See. Pet. Br. at 18, 20. The State
concedes this Court and the court of appeals have both expressly held section 78-4616(1) "does not govern constitutionally-based challenges, such as Batson ." kL at 18, 20
(citations omitted). It also concedes that Harrison expressly held rule 18fs time frame
applies to Batson objections. IcL at 20 (citation omitted). Thus, the applicability of
section 78-46-16(1) is inapposite in this case because the clear timeliness rule at the time
of Valdez's objection was rule 18 as interpreted by Harrison. See Ford, 498 U.S. at 424.
Next, the State argues the court of appeals erred in holding Valdez's objection met
rule 18's good cause requirement. Pet. Br. at 21-22. First, the State proposes a definition
of good cause adopted in In re Rights to Use of Water, 2004 UT 106,^43, 110 P.3d 666.
This definition of good cause, however, applies to requests for retroactive extensions for
filing motions, not to the timeliness of a Batson objection. See kL at ^42-43. Instead,
this Court should look to Harrison, which defines good cause as used in rule 18.
Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776 (holding trial court "implicitly" found good cause "by allowing
counsel to proceed with their arguments"); see. Ford, 498 U.S. at 421 ("The fact that the
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[trial] court reviewed petitioner's [Batson] claim on the merits . . . presupposes the
claim's timeliness."). To hold otherwise, would impermissibly deny Valdez the
opportunity to raise his Batson challenge on appeal. See id. at 424.
Second, the State claims this case is distinguishable from Harrison because, by
allowing the parties to proceed with their arguments and overruling Valdez's Batson
objection on the merits, the trial court did not implicitly find good cause, but simply
"believed it was best to make a record of the merits." Pet. Br. at 22 (citing State v.
Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 458 n.8 (Utah 1994)). Alvarez, however, is distinguishable. In
Alvarez, there was no question of whether the defendant's Batson objection was timely.
Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 458 n.8. Instead, the trial court ruled the defendant failed to
establish a prima facie case and "requested that the prosecutor put on his race-neutral
reasons for excluding jurors" simply to facilitate the appeal. IcL_ Conversely, here, the
trial court asked the prosecutor to explain his challenges not to facilitate the appeal but to
make a ruling based on the prosecutor's explanation. R. 209:78-79. Thus, this case is
comparable to Harrison, where the trial court's act of asking the prosecutor to explain the
challenges, accepting the prosecutor's explanation and denying the defendant's objection
was an implicit finding of good cause. See_ Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776.
Third, the State claims Harrison is distinguishable because the trial court did not
have discretion to find good cause since Valdez "did not claim good cause" existed. Pet.
Br. at 22. Valdez, however, had no reason to argue good cause existed because the trial
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court reached the merits of his Batson objection. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at ^jlO-11;
see Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776. Besides, "Utah courts do 'not require a party to continue
to object once a motion has been made, and the trial court has rendered a decision on the
issue.'" Valdez. 2004 UT App 214 at ^[13 (quoting Hoffhine . 2001 UT 4 at T[14).
Finally, the State complains the timing of Valdez's objection forced the prosecutor
to base his explanation on his memory and his notes, which were "unreadable." Pet. Br.
at 36. However, because the Utah rule allows a defendant to make a Batson objection at
any time before evidence is presented, the prosecutor should have protected himself by
taking legible notes. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(2); Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116, 121
(2d Cir. 1992) ("Prosecutors would be well advised - when contemplating striking a
jurors for reasons of demeanor - to make contemporaneous notes as to the specific
behavior on the prospective juror's part that renders such person unsuitable for service
on a particular case."). Besides, not so much time passed that the prosecutor would have
had difficulty remembering the reasons for his peremptory strikes. See R. 209:70-78.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ADDRESS WHETHER VALDEZ
PROPERLY PRESERVED HIS BATSON CLAIM

Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure says "[ojnly the questions set
forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme Court."
Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). This Court should not address the State's preservation
argument because it is not part of the issue on certiorari review. In the court of appeals,
the State argued Valdez did not preserve his Batson claim. See Valdez, 2004 UT App
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214 at ^12. The court of appeals rejected this argument. S^e. id at ^12-13. In its
petition for a writ of certiorari, the State did not challenge the court of appeals5 rejection
of its preservation argument. See Cert. Pet. at 5-14. Accordingly, this Court did not
grant certiorari to decide whether the court of appeals correctly held Valdez's argument
was preserved. See Order dated November 5, 2004. Instead, this Court granted
certiorari to decide "[w]hether a Batson challenge may be deemed timely if the jury has
been sworn and the remainder of the venire excused," and "[w]hether the court of
appeals applied the correct criteria for a Batson analysis and the correct standard of
review on appeal." IcL Thus, because preservation is not part of the issue on certiorari
review, this Court should decline to address the State's preservation argument.
Besides, the court of appeals properly rejected the State's preservation argument.
In the court of appeals, the State argued Valdez did not preserve his Batson objection
because, although he objected "to the State's use of peremptory challenges to strike
women from the jury," he did not later "challenge the validity of the prosecutor's
explanations for the strikes." See Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at 1J12. The court of
appeals explained that Utah has "no clear rule requiring a defendant to renew a Batson
objection or to object specifically to the State's offered explanations." IdL at f 13
(quoting Ford, 498 U.S. at 424). "Rather, Utah courts do 'not require a party to continue
to object once a motion has been made, and the trial court has rendered a decision on the
issue.'" Id (quoting Hoffhme, 2001 UT 4 at 1J14); see State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 336-

22

43 (Utah 1991) (reaching merits of Batson claim where defendant did not renew
objection); State v. Bowman. 945 P.2d 153, 155-57 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (same);
Harrison, 805 P.2d at 773, 778 (same); State v. Maciah 854 P.2d 543, 544-47 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) (same). Thus, Valdez preserved his Batson issue for appeal because he
"objected to the State's use of peremptory challenges, thereby preventing any claim that
he strategically hid his objection until after obtaining an unsatisfactory result." Valdez,
2004 UT App 214 at 1J13 : see Holgate. 2000 UT 74 at 111.
III.

THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM BECAUSE THE COURT OF
APPEALS APPLIED THE CORRECT CRITERIA FOR A BATSON
ANALYSIS

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution "prohibits discrimination injury selection on the basis of gender, or on the
assumption that an individual will be biased in a particular case for no reason other than
the fact that the person happens to be a woman." J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146
(1994). To determine whether a peremptory strike violates equal protection, this Court
and the Supreme Court have adopted a three-step test. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-98
(outlining test in racial discrimination case); J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 128-29 (holding Batson's
equal protection principles "apply equally to gender discrimination"); State v. Cantu, 778
P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989) (applying test to racial discrimination case); Harrison, 805
P.2d at 776 (applying test to gender discrimination case). First, "the opponent of a
peremptory challenge" must "ma[ke] out a prima facie case of [gender] discrimination."
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State v. ColwelL 2000 UT 8,TJ17, 994 P.2d 177 (citations omitted). Second, "the burden
of production shifts" and "the proponent of the strike" must "come forward with a
[gender]-neutral explanation." Id. (citations omitted). Third, "[i]f a [genderj-neutral
explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the
strike has proved purposeful [gender] discrimination." Id. (citations omitted).
In its decision, the court of appeals applied this three-step test and held the State's
peremptory strikes violated equal protection. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at ffl[18-19. The
question on certiorari is whether the court of appeals applied the correct criteria to each
step. See Order dated November 5, 2004. This Court should affirm because the court of
appeals applied the correct criteria to each step of the Batson test. First, the court of
appeals applied the correct criteria for analyzing steps one and two. See Sections A; B.
Second, because the court of appeals applied the correct criteria for a step two analysis
and concluded the State's explanations were not gender-neutral, the court of appeals
correctly declined to proceed to step three. See. Section C. Third, even if the court of
appeals applied the incorrect criteria for a step two analysis, it ultimately would have
reached the same conclusion under step Ihree. See Section D.
A,

The Court of Appeals Applied the Correct Criteria For a Step One Analysis.
"Where the proponent of the peremptory challenge fails to contest the sufficiency

of the prima facie case at trial and merely provides a rebuttal explanation for the
challenge, the issue of whether a prima facie case was established is waived." State v.
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Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted); see Hernandez v.
New York. 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991) (holding once State has offered race-neutral
explanation and court has ruled on question of discrimination, issue of whether
defendant made prima facie showing is moot); Colwell. 2000 UT 8 at f 18 (same);
Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at ^[8 (same); Chatwin. 2002 UT App 363 at TJ9 (same). In this
case, the State waived the issue of whether a prima facie case was established. When
defense counsel objected to the State's peremptory strikes, the State did not insist Valdez
establish a prima facie case. R. 209:78-80. Instead, it accepted Valdez's statement that
he had shown Ma pattern of [discrimination] based on gender," and offered an
explanation. Icl On appeal, the State conceded "that it waived the issue of whether
Valdez presented a prima facie case of discrimination." Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at
TJ20. Thus, the court of appeals correctly proceeded to step two of the Batson test. Id.
In its brief, the State concedes that the court of appeals correctly proceeded to step
two because it waived the issue of whether Valdez made a prima facie showing. Pet. Br.
at 27. Regardless, the State argues the court of appeals erred "in its step one analysis"
because it failed "to recognize that the weakness or strength of the prima facie showing .
. . remains relevant for step three." LI In this case, however, the court of appeals did not
reach step three because it decided the case under step two. See Valdez, 2004 UT App
214 at lflj20, 30. Thus, it could not have erred by failing to consider Valdez's prima facie
case in step three because it did not conduct a step three analysis. IcL The State also
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argues the court of appeals erred by failing to acknowledge that Valdez's prima facie
case was "weak." Pet. Br. at 28. Again, this argument ignores the fact that the court of
appeals had no reason to measure the strength of Valdez's prima facie case because the
State waived this issue and the court of atppeals did not reach step three of the Batson
test. See Valdez. 2004 UT App 214 at ^ 2 0 , 30.
Besides, Valdez established a strong prima facie case. "To establish a prima facie
case, a defendant must demonstrate facts and circumstances that raise the necessary
inference of purposeful discrimination." Alvarez., 872 P.2d at 455 (citation omitted). In
this case, the State used 100 percent of ils peremptory strikes against women. R. 94. By
striking women, the State exhibited a pattern of striking members of a cognizable group.
See Span, 819 P.2d at 341 (defining cognizable group as "recognizable, distinct class,
singled out for different treatment" (citation omitted)). This pattern alone is sufficient to
establish a prima facie case. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97 (holding pattern of striking
members of cognizable group may give rise to inference of discrimination); Alvarez. 872
P.2d at 457 ("Numerical evidence alone may be sufficient to establish a pattern of
peremptory strikes against minority jurors, but a defendant must show that 'his opponent
has struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire, or has used
a disproportionate number of his peremptories against the group'"). The fact that four
women survived the State's challenges does not excuse the State's pattern of striking
women. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142 n. 13 (holding "possibility that members of both
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genders will get on the jury despite the intentional discrimination is beside the point"
because the "exclusion of even one juror for impermissible reasons harms that juror and
undermines public confidence in the fairness of the system").
Moreover, Valdez's prima facie case was strengthened by the underlying facts of
the case. First, Valdez was accused of domestic violence, which invokes gender-related
issues and requires careful scrutiny. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140 (holding gender
discrimination "during jury selection 'invites cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality
and its obligation to adhere to the law'"; this "potential for cynicism is particularly acute
in cases where gender-related issues are prominent, such as cases involving rape, sexual
harassment, or paternity" (citation omitted)). Second, the alleged victim and all but one
of the State's witnesses were women and Valdez, the defendant, was a man.2 R. 210-11.
Thus, the State had an incentive to strike women because they would be more judgmental
of the contradictory stories of the State's female witnesses. See. State v. Call 508 S.E.2d
496, 510 (N.C. 1998) (holding one factor in evaluating whether prima facie case has
been established is "gender of the defendant, the victim and any key witnesses").
R

The Court of Appeals Applied the Correct Criteria For a Step Two Analysis.
Once the defendant has made out a prima facie case of gender discrimination, the

State must "come forward with a [gender]-neutral explanation." Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at

2

The only male witness to testify was Officer Thirston Beger, whose testimony
dealt with the information Jiminez told him after the alleged crime. R. 211:97-100.
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Tfl7 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has said this step "does not demand an
explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible." Purkett v. Elem. 514 U.S. 765, 768
(1995). Rather, to be deemed neutral, the State's explanation need only "articulate a
neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried," and "give a 'clear and
reasonably specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges"
("Batson's step two requirements"). Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 & n.20 (quoting Texas Dept.
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)). Batson 's step two
requirements do not assess the "persuasiveness" of the explanation. Purkett. 514 U.S. at
769. They simply prevent the prosecutor from satisfying step two "by merely denying
that he had a discriminatory motive or by merely affirming his good faith." I&_ In other
words, a "'legitimate reason' is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not
deny equal protection." Id. (citations omitted).
Requiring the State's step two explanation to satisfy Batson's step two
requirements is appropriate because it ensures the defendant will have the information
necessary to carry his burden, and the trial court will have the information necessary to
conduct a step three analysis. First, requiring the State to provide a step two explanation
that meets Batson's step two requirements guarantees the defendant will receive the
information necessary to show, if true, that the State's peremptory strike violated equal
protection. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257-58. In Burdine, the Supreme Court applied the
Batson test to determine whether an employer's act of firing an employee violated equal
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protection. Id. at 250-51. There, it reasoned that the employer's step two explanation
need not be persuasive because Batson 's step two requirements ensure the employee will
receive enough information to carry her burden. IdL. at 257-58. In other words, because
the employer is required to provide a reason for firing the employee that is facially
neutral, legitimate, clear and reasonably specific, and particular to the case to be tried, the
employee will receive the information necessary to prove, if true, the termination violated
equal protection. IcL In the area of peremptory strikes, Batson's step two requirements
become even more important. In employment discrimination cases, the employee is
aided in carrying her burden by "the liberal discovery rules applicable to any civil suit in
federal court," and "the [employee's] access to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's investigatory files concerning her complaint." Id. at 258. Whereas, in
peremptory strike cases, the information available to the defendant to prove the State's
peremptory strikes violated equal protection is largely the information the State itself
provides under step two. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (holding step three requires
"sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be
available"); Colwell 2000 UT 8 at 1J20 (holding step three "generally turns on the
credibility of the proponent of the strike" (citation omitted)).
Second, requiring the State to provide a step two explanation that meets Batson 's
step two requirements ensures the trial court will not be forced to undertake the step three
analysis unnecessarily or with an incomplete record. Under step three, the trial court
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must decide whether the State's explanation actually, not just facially, meets Batson's
step two requirements. See Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at fl3 (citing Colwell 2000 UT 8
at ^|22). To make this decision, the trial court looks beyond the face of the State's
explanation and "undertake[s] 'a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available."' See idL (quoting Ratson, 476 U.S. at 93). If the
State is not required to provide an explanation under step two that is, on its face, neutral,
legitimate, clear and reasonably specific, and particular to the case to be tried, then the
trial court will be forced to conduct the sensitive step three analysis with an incomplete
understanding of the circumstances and direct evidence of intent necessary to make a
ruling. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257-58 (noting step two creates factual basis for step
three ruling because requires proponent of peremptory strike to provide "explanation of
its legitimate reasons" that is "clear and reasonably specific").
Moreover, the sensitive step three analysis requires the trial court to conduct an indepth, factor-by-factor review of the circumstances surrounding the peremptory strike.
See Cantu, 778 P.2d at 518-19. If the State's step two explanation need not facially meet
Batson's step two requirements, then the trial court will almost always be forced to
embark on step three's detailed analysis, even where the State's explanation is obviously
discriminatory. For example, in People v. Blackwell, 665 N.E.2d 782 (111. 1996), the
prosecutor struck female jurors because they were "proactive" or had been crime victims.
Id at 787. The court easily disposed of this explanation in step two because the
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prosecutor did not peremptorily strike any of the similarly-situated male jurors. Id. If
Batson's step two requirements had not applied to step two's facial determination, then
the trial court would have had to conduct a rigorous step three analysis, regardless of the
discrimination inherent in the explanation. Id.
In this case, the court of appeals applied the correct criteria for a step two analysis.
The court of appeals listed the criteria for determining step two as follows:
The second step [of the analysis] requires "the prosecutor to
come forward with a race-neutral explanation for the
challenge." This step "does not demand an explanation that
is persuasive, or even plausible." So long as the reasons
given are "'(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3)
clear and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate,'" "'the
reasons offered will be deemed race neutral.'"
Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at ^21 (quoting Cannon. 2002 UT App 18 at %9). This
statement of Batson's step two requirements exactly follows the Supreme Court's
instruction in Batson and Purkett. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 & n.20 (holding step two
explanation must "articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be
tried," and "give a 'clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons'
for exercising the challenges" (citation omitted)); Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768-69 (holding
step two "does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible").
The State does not directly challenge the court of appeals' holding that Batson 's
step two requirements apply to step two. Pet. Br. at 29-31. Instead, it argues the court of
appeals erred by treating Batson's step two requirements as factors rather than simply as
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"general descriptions of the type of explanation needed." Id^ at 31 (citations omitted).
This argument contradicts the mandatory language used by the Supreme Court in Batson
and by this Court when applying Batson, See Batson. 476 U.S. at 98 & n.20 (holding
step two explanation "must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case
to be tried," and "must give a 'clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his
'legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges" (citation omitted)); Colwell, 2000 UT
8 at TJ22 (holding "proponent's reason given to justify a peremptory challenge must be
'"(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4)
legitimate."'" (citations omitted); Higginbotham. 917 P.2d at 548 (same); Cantu, 778
P.2d at 518-19 (same).
Besides, whether Batson's step two requirements are factors or mere descriptions,
the result is the same—if the explanation is not neutral, legitimate, clear and reasonably
specific, and related to the case to be tried, then it does not satisfy step two and the trial
court has no need to proceed to step three. See. University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n
of Utah, 736 P.2d 630, 634-35 (Utah 1987) (applying Batson test to age discrimination
case and holding step two satisfied because explanation raised "genuine issue of fact"
and presented "legitimate reasons for not hiring appellant"). Contrary to the State's
argument, this result does not transform step two's facial determination into step three's
detailed analysis. See Pet. Br. at 31. Instead, it simply ensures that the State's
explanation is detailed enough to allow the defendant to meet his burden and the trial
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court to make an educated ruling. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257-58 (holding Batson 's
step two requirements ensure employee will receive enough information to carry burden
and creates factual basis for step three ruling); Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at ^[29-30
(explaining failure to apply Batson's step two requirements to step two would allow State
to "more easily" mask "sexist motives" by use of "unrelated but inherently
nondiscriminatory explanations"). Thus, this Court should affirm the court of appeals'
decision because it applied the correct criteria for determining step two.
C.

The Court of Appeals Correctly Concluded the State's Explanations Failed
to Satisfy Step Two and Declined to Proceed to Step Three.
This Court granted a writ of certiorari to decide "[w]hether the court of appeals

applied the correct criteria for a Batson analysis." Order dated November 5, 2004. This
narrow statement of the issue is appropriate because the State's petition for a writ of
certiorari did not challenge the court of appeals' decision on the merits. See Cert. Pet. at
13. As discussed above, the court of appeals applied the correct criteria for a step two
analysis. See Section III.B. Thus, this Court should affirm the court of appeals'
recitation of the step two criteria and decline to review the court of appeals' application
of these criteria to the facts of this case. See. Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4) ("Only the
questions set forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the
Supreme Court."); c£ State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840, 841 (Utah 1994) (dismissing certiorari
in case where State challenged court of appeals' Utah Constitution analysis but not
federal constitution analysis because "evidence seized . . . must be suppressed regardless
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of any decision we might render on the state constitutional issue1').
Regardless, this Court should affirm because the court of appeals correctly held
the State's explanations did not satisfy the step two criteria. The court of appeals held
the State's explanations were not clear and reasonably specific because they were
demeanor-based, but did "not appear to have anything to do with the jurors themselves."
See VaWez, 2004 UT App 214 at ffi|26-27. This holding is correct. The State said it
struck Morely and Valerio because they "were 'overly compassionate'" and Gonzalez
because she "was 'matter of fact.'" Id, at ^J26; R. 209:79-80. These explanations were
entirely demeanor-based and should have been supported by specific descriptions of
behavior. See Brown, 973 F.2d at 121 (holding demeanor-based explanations require
examples of "specific behavior" that render juror "unsuitable for service"); Blackwell,
665 N.E.2d at 788 (holding "repeated use of vague, mistaken, and inconsistent
explanations suggests that the State's reasons are pretextual" (citation omitted)). The
State, however, provided no specific descriptions. R. 209:79-80. Although it mentioned
Valerio's work at "a nonprofit," it admitted this was "not a basis upon which to strike
her." IdL at 79. Similarly, although it cited Morely's work as a piano teacher and her
subscriptions to the Reader's Digest, the Deseret News, and Sports Illustrated, it did not
explain and the record does not reveal how these interests divulged undue compassion.
Id. at 27, 79-80. Instead, the record shows Morely's discussion of herself was similar in
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form and content to other jurors' discussions.3 Id. at 27.
Further, as explained by the court of appeals:
the prosecutor stated variously "I felt her responses lined up
in a way that would make her not a helpful witness for the
State . . . . Her responses to me seemed matter of fact and I
felt like her responses would not make her a good juror for
the State.... I don't recall what it was [about Ms.
Thornton], there was something that I immediately decided
that I would make her one of my strikes."
Valdez 2004 UT App 214 at Tf26 (alteration in original); R. 209:79-80. The mere
allegation of a reason, however, is not sufficiently clear and specific to justify a strike.
See New Mexico v. Aragon, 784 P.2d 16, 21 (N.M. 1989) (holding State's explanation
that it struck black jurors because they were related to another defendant was not clear or
reasonably specific because not supported by record); BlackwelL 665 N.E.2d at 787
(holding State's explanation that it struck female jurors because it "felt uncomfortable
with them" was "vague"). Otherwise, parties could always rebut a Batson challenge by
alluding to a legitimate reason. See United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11 th
Cir. 1989) (holding prosecutor's explanation that he struck juror because "I just got a
feeling about him," "obviously [fell] short" of being clear and reasonably specific).
Thus, the court of appeals correctly held the State's "vague and generic descriptions" of

3

Eight men and eleven women were employed, one man and three women
enjoyed music, five men and eleven women subscribed to a newspaper, one man and two
women subscribed to Sports Illustrated, and one man and two women enjoyed reading.
R. 209:10-32.
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the struck jurors were not clear or reasonably specific, as required by step two, and
concluded these failures alone were sufficient to reverse. Valdez. 2004 UT App 214 at
TJ27; see J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142 n.13 (holding "exclusion of even one juror for
impermissible reasons harms that juror and undermines public confidence in the fairness
of the system").
Although unnecessary to its decision, the court of appeals also noted that some of
the State's explanations were "unrelated to the case at hand." Valdez, 2004 UT App 214
at ^28. As an example, the court of appeals cited the State's explanation that it struck
"Thornton because she had been on a jury that had found a defendant, who had been
charged with murder, guilty of manslaughter." Id. This explanation was irrelevant
because Valdez was not charged with manslaughter or any other lesser-included offense.
R. 2-4; 35-38. Thus, "Thornton's participation on a jury that convicted another
defendant of manslaughter does not undermine her ability to be impartial in the present
case." Valdez. 2004 UT App 214 at 1J28.
The court of appeals did not reach the adequacy of the State's remaining
explanations, but these explanations also failed step two. See Valdez, 2004 UT App 214
at ^28-29. First, the State struck Morely in favor of a male juror who enjoyed hunting
because he "would know about guns." R. 209:79-80. However, there was no evidence
in the record to suggest Morely did not know about guns. Id. at 27; see State v. Jensen,
2003 UT App 273,ffif2, 15, 76 P.3d 188 (holding State's explanation that it struck men
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involved in protective orders because "assumed" they were the respondents was not
gender-neutral because "motivation was unavoidably linked to the jurors' gender");
United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 825 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding State's explanation
that it struck juror "because she lived in . . . poor and violent community whose residents
are likely to be 'anesthetized to such violence'" was not race-neutral because "invocation
of residence both reflected and conveyed deeply ingrained and pernicious stereotypes").
Although a simple question would have revealed Morely's gun knowledge, the State
struck Morely without asking her any questions. R. 209:79-80; see. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at
143 ("If conducted properly, voir dire can inform litigants about potential jurors, making
reliance upon stereotypical and pejorative notions about a particular gender . ..
unnecessary and unwise."). Second, the State struck Gonzalez and Thornton because
they "had heard of the case." R. 209:79. However, a third juror, Peggy Curtis, had also
heard of the case and remembered it in far more detail than Gonzalez or Thornton. IcL at
58, 61-62, 65-66, 79. Thus, the State's explanation that it struck Gonzalez and Thornton
because they had heard of the case was suspect and required clarification. IJL
Accordingly, the court of appeals correctly determined that the State's failure to provide
explanations that satisfied criteria of step two warranted reversal in this case.
D.

Even If this Court Concludes the Court of Appeals Applied the Incorrect
Criteria For a Step Two Analysis, It Should Still Affirm Because the Court of
Appeals Would Have Reached the Same Conclusion Under Step Three.
This Court's decisions have consistently applied Batson 's step two requirements
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to the Batson analysis. See ColwelL 2000 UT 8 at Tf22 (holding "proponent's reason
given to justify a peremptory challenge must be '"(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being
tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate.'"" (citations omitted);
Higginbotham. 917 P.2d at 548 (same); Cantu, 778 P.2d at 518-19 (same). Specifically,
this Court's decisions have said a trial court, if it reaches step three, must review the
circumstances of the case and decide whether the State's explanation was truly neutral,
meaning it actually satisfied Batson's step two requirements. See Colwelh 2000 UT 8 at
^{22 (affirming under step three because explanation satisfied Batson 's step two
requirements); Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548 (same). Although this Court has not said
whether Batson's step two requirements also apply step two, its decisions have suggested
a trial court, under step two, should look at the State's explanation and decide whether it
was facially neutral, meaning it appeared, on its face, to satisfy Batson's step two
requirements. See Span. 819 P.2d at 343 (without distinguishing between steps two and
three, noting prosecutor "articulated only a vague reason not related to the facts of the
case for striking" juror, and concluding "[f]rom this it is difficult to determine whether or
not the prosecutor's reason for striking [juror] was race-neutral"); Cantu, 778 P.2d at
518-19 (without distinguishing between steps two and three, holding State's explanation
that it struck Hispanic juror because it was angry at defense counsel who wanted
Hispanic juror, violated equal protection because "neither neutral nor legitimate");
University of Utah, 736 P.2d at 634-35 (applying Batson test to age discrimination case
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and holding step two satisfied because employer's explanation presented "legitimate
reasons for not hiring appellant").
As discussed above, removing Batson's step two requirements from step two is
contrary to Batson and Purkett. See Section III.B; Vajdez, 2004 UT App 214 at ^[21. It
also inhibits the defendant's ability to carry his burden to show the State's peremptory
strike violated equal protection, and forces trial courts to conduct the step three analysis
unnecessarily and without a complete record. See kL Regardless, if this Court concludes
that Batson's step two requirements apply only to step three, then this Court should issue
a decision clarifying what criteria go where in the Batson analysis, but affirming because
the court of appeals would have reached the same decision under step three.
If the State "tender[s] a neutral explanation" under step two, then the trial court
must proceed to step three. Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363 at f7 (citing Colwell 2000 UT 8
at 1HJ17, 19). Under step three, the trial court must "look beyond" the face of the
explanation and "determine whether the strike was purposefully discriminatory." Id. To
make this determination, the trial court should examine the following factors:
"(1) alleged group bias not shown to be shared by the juror in
question, (2) failure to examine the juror or perfunctory
examination assuming neither the trial court nor opposing
counsel had questioned the juror, (3) singling the juror out for
special questioning designed to evoke a certain response, (4)
the prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the facts of the case,
and (5) a challenge based on reasons equally applicable to
jurors who were not challenged."
Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at ]fl3 (quoting Cantu_, 778 P.2d at 518-19) ("step three
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factors"). "If, following this analysis, the trial court does not conclude that the reasons
for the [State's] challenge are (1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear and
reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate, the trial court must disallow the peremptory
challenge." Id (quoting ColwelL 2000 UT 8 at %L2).
The trial court's step three decision "will not be set aside unless it is clearly
erroneous." ColwelL 2000 UT 8 at ^[20. "To show clear error, the appellant must
marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's finding and then demonstrate
that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to
support the findings." Id. The marshaled evidence in this case is as follows:
(1) Valerio worked for a nonprofit agency where she trained brain injured people
for employment; had a high school education with some trade schooling classes; was
married to a customer service representative; had two young children, subscribed to
Sports Illustrated; and enjoyed camping, outdoor activities, and crafts. R. 209:14-16.
The State struck Valerio because "her responses lined up in a way that would make her
not a helpful witness for the State and that she would be somewhat overly
compassionate." Id. at 79. The State also mentioned that Valerio worked for a nonprofit
brain injury place, but concluded this was "not a basis upon which to strike her." Id_
(2) Gonzalez was a housekeeper in the process of retiring; had a high school
education; was married to a retired man; had three grown children; subscribed to The
Salt Lake Tribune and craft magazines; and enjoyed her cabin and grandchildren. R.
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209:18-19. Gonzalez vaguely remembered hearing about the case, but could not
remember where it happened and believed it would not bias her decision in the case. IcL
at 65. The State struck Gonzalez because ?f[s]he had heard of the case . . . though she
said that it wouldn't bother her," and "her responses to me seemed matter of fact and I
felt like her responses would not make her a good juror for the State." IcL at 79-80.
(3) Thornton did payroll/benefits for a family plumbing business; had attended
two years of college; was married to the owner of the plumbing business; had three
teenage children; subscribed to publications like Deseret News and Popular Science; and
enjoyed reading and Irish folk dancing. R. 209:14. Thornton had served on a jury eight
years prior where the defendant was convicted of manslaughter, but said this would not
bias her decision in this case. IcL at 49-50. Thornton vaguely remembered hearing about
Valdez's case, but said it would not bias her decision in this case. IcL at 58-59. The State
struck Thornton because she had "heard of the case," "I don't recall what it was, there
was something that I immediately decided that I would make her one of my strikes," and
she had "been on a jury and he was found guilty of a manslaughter, which I thought was
probably a one-step reduction, at least that's the assumption." IcL at 79.
(4) Morely worked part-time for a school district helping children boost their
reading and math levels; was a part-time piano teacher; had a bachelor's degree; was
married to a Deseret Book store manager; had five teenage to early-twenties children,
one of whom was deceased; subscribed to Readers Digest, Deseret News, and Sports
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Illustrated; and enjoyed music, baking, outdoor activities with her family, camping, and
going to football games. R. 209:27-28. The State struck Morely because another
potential juror, a male, "was a hunter" and "would know things about guns." IcL at 7980. Although it could not clearly read its notes, the State believed Morely's "responses
about position, her responses to little subtle things like her teaching piano lessons and the
magazines she chose," revealed her as a person "that might be willing to let bygones be
bygones, what I would say overly compassionate." IcL The State may have had other
reasons for rejecting Morely, but it could not read its notes. IdL.
(5) Curtis had heard of the case, could not remember all details, and believed her
memory would not bias her decision. R. 209:61-62. Curtis served on the jury. R. 94.
Based on this evidence, the trial court ruled:
I'm satisfied with your explanation. I find . . . peremptory
challenges [] Thornton, [] Valerio, [] Gonzalez, and [] Morely
are gender neutral, they are related specifically to this case.
They were clearly stated and Ihey are specific and legitimate.
Therefore I am denying the challenge based on gender. I also
note this is a jury of four men and four women.
R. 209:80.
Under step two, the court of appeals reviewed the trial court's ruling for an abuse
of discretion. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at ^17. To reach its decision, the court of
appeals looked at the State's explanation and "the general context of the case and the
specific issues involved," and held the State's explanation did not satisfy step two
because it did not satisfy Batson's step two requirements. Id at THJ17, 21 (citation
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omitted); see Section III.C. Had the court of appeals proceeded to step three, it would
have conducted the same analysis and reached the same conclusion. Valdez, 2004 UT
App 214 at Tffl26-28. As under step two, it would have reviewed the State's explanation
to determine whether the explanation satisfied Batson 's step two requirements. Id.;
ColwelL 2000 UT 8 at ^|22 (applying Batson's step two requirements to step three
analysis). Then, as under step two, it would have concluded that striking female jurors
because they were too compassionate and too matter-of-fact, without some genderindependent reason for perceiving compassion or matter-of-factness, was not clear or
reasonably specific. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at !Hf26-27; see. United States v. Tindle,
860 F.2d 125, 129 (4 th Cir. 1988) (holding proper to strike juror because similar in size
and appearance to defendant arguing mistaken identification because of size and
appearance); United States v. Moreno, 878 F.2d 817, 820 (5 th Cir. 1989) (holding proper
to strike juror who had hostile attitude toward police); United States v. McCoy , 848 F.2d
743, 745 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding proper to strike juror because young and unemployed
like defendant); United States v. Briscoe. 896 F.2d 1476, 1488 (7 th Cir. 1990) (holding
proper to strike juror because prior job as youth supervisor at penal facility would make
sympathetic to defendant); United States v. Johnson, 905 F.2d 222, 223 (8 th Cir. 1990)
(holding proper to strike juror who worked with Division of Family Services because of
possible sympathy for defendant); United States v. Ramirez-Soberanes, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 6666 (10th Cir. Apr. 11, 2000) (unpublished opinion) (holding proper to strike
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juror because fast-food workers "might have sympathies or prejudices for or against
minorities") (Addendum E); State v. Williams, 545 So.2d 651, 655 (La. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding proper to strike juror because gazed at defendant and mother sympathetically).
The only difference would have been that the court of appeals' analysis under step
three would have been much more fact-intensive because it would have been required to
review each of the step three factors before reaching its conclusion. See Cantu, 778 P.2d
at 518-19. Reviewing the step three factors would only have solidified the court of
appeals' conclusion. First, the marshaled facts do not show Valerio, Morely, or
Gonzalez shared the group bias alleged by the State. R. 209. The State accused Valerio
and Morely of being overly compassionate and Gonzalez of being matter of fact, but the
record does not reveal a non-gender basis for these complaints. See Section III.C.
Similarly, the State struck Morely because she did not know about guns, but the record
does not say whether Morely knew about guns. See id. Second, the State did not
question the jurors it struck even though questioning could have revealed the biases it
suspected. R. 209:14-15, 18, 27, 49, 65-66; see J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 143 ("If conducted
properly, voir dire can inform litigants about potential jurors, making reliance upon
stereotypical and pejorative notions about a particular gender . . . unnecessary and
unwise."). Third, the State's reasons for striking Morely and Thornton were unrelated to
Valdez's trial and would not have affected their ability to be effective jurors. See
Section III.C. Fourth, the State struck the four women for reasons equally applicable to
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other jurors not similarly challenged. See id.
Besides, if this Court believes the court of appeals may have reached a different
decision had it reached step three, then it should answer the question on certiorari
review—whether the court of appeals applied the correct criteria for a Batson
analysis—and remand to the court of appeals for application of the correct criteria to
Valdez's case. See Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). By so doing, this Court will permit the
court of appeals to analyze step three based on full-briefing of the issue. Both parties
extensively briefed this issue in the court of appeals, including in-depth analyses of the
step three factors and of whether the trial court provided sufficient findings and
conclusions to allow appellate review. See Span, 819 P.2d at 343 (remanding because
lack of findings by trial court made difficult to assess adequacy of State's explanation).
IV.

THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM BECAUSE THE COURT OF
APPEALS APPLIED THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW
ON APPEAL

First, the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review for determining
step one. This Court has held step one is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See
Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 456. Following this Court's guidance, the court of appeals
reviewed step one for abuse of discretion. Valdez., 2004 UT App 214 at Tfl5. In a
footnote, the State suggests the court of appeals' use of an abuse of discretion standard in
step one was "questionable" because "a prima facie showing is normally treated as a
question of law." Pet. Br. at 34 n.5 (citing Bair v. Axiom Design. 2001 UT 20,Tfl3, 20
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P.3d 388). This Court, however, has specifically held that it "is particularly appropriate"
to review the prima facie showing of step one for an abuse of discretion. See Alvarez.
872 P.2d at 456 n.3 (citation omitted).
Second, the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review to step two.
This Court has not said what standard of review applies to step two. See ColwelL 2000
UT 8 at 1ffll 1, 19; Higginbotham. 917 P.2d at 548; Span, 819 P.2d at 338; Cantu, 778
P.2d at 518; University of Utah, 736 P.2d at 634-35. It has, however, provided guidance
as to how an appellate court should select a standard of review. See State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). In Pena_, this Court employed "the metaphor of the judicial
pasture." State v. Brake. 2004 UT 95^13. 103 P.3d 699. "The pasture is judicial
discretion, and is bounded by fences which reduce or enlarge access to the available crop
of discretion based on the nature of the matter which a judge is called upon to decide."
Id. "For example, the fence line is long for pure questions of fact and narrow for
questions of law corresponding to the 'clearly erroneous and correction-of-error
standards,5 respectively." Id. (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 937). "Mixed questions of law
and fact comprise a third category which challenge those responsible for placing the
fence lines along the spectrum of discretion." Id. The "'closeness of appellate review of
the application of law to fact actually runs the entire length of this spectrum.'" Id.
(quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 938). When deciding how much discretion to grant a trial
court, appellate courts should grant trial courts more discretion:
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(i) when the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied are
so complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing
the relevance of all these facts can be spelled out; (ii) when
the situation to which the legal principle is to be applied is
sufficiently new to the courts that appellate judges are unable
to anticipate and articulate definitively what factors should be
outcome determinative; and (iii) when the trial judge has
observed 'facts,5 such as a witness's appearance and
demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot
be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate
courts.
Pena, 869 P.2d at 939 (citation omitted).
In this case, the court of appeals correctly reviewed step two for an abuse of
discretion. As explained in section III.B, the step two analysis requires a trial court to
"look to the face of the State's explanations" and determine whether they meet Batson 's
step two requirements. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at ^[17. To conduct this analysis, the
trial court "does not weigh evidence" as it would a "factual issue," but must "consider[]
the general context of the case and the specific issues involved." IcL_ Accordingly, the
step two analysis is not a pure question of fact or a pure question of law. See Pena, 869
P.2d at 937. Instead, it is a mixed question of fact and law and its standard of review
falls somewhere between clear error and correctness on the spectrum. Id. at 938. Thus,
the court of appeals correctly determined that "it is appropriate to consider this issue one
of discretion with the trial court and to review the trial court's determination for abuse of
that discretion." Valdez. 2004 UT App 214 at lfl7.
In a footnote, the State suggests the court of appeals' use of an abuse of discretion
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standard in step two was "questionable" because "whether an explanation is inherently
discriminatory" is "a question of law." Pet. Br. at 34 n.5 (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at
359, and Jensen, 2003 UT App 273 at TJ15). Jensen and Hernandez, however, do not
review step two as a question of law. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359-60; Jensen, 2003
UT App 273 at 1fl[15, 18. Instead, they hold "as a matter of law" that the peremptory
strikes violated equal protection. Id.; see Black's Law Dictionary 1000 (8th Ed. 2004)
(defining "matter of law" not as a standard of review, but as a "matter involving a judicial
inquiry into the applicable law"). In fact, Jensen actually reviewed step two for clear
error, giving the trial court more discretion than the court of appeals granted the trial
court in this case. See Jensen, 2003 UT App 273 at 118.
Third, the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review to step three.
This Court and the Supreme Court have held step three is reviewed for clear error. See
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364-69 (applying clearly erroneous standard to step three);
Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at ^{20 (same); Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548 (same); Cantu, 778
P.2d at 518 (same). A clear error standard is warranted because step three "represents a
finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference on appeal." Hernandez , 500 U.S. at
364; see Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at ^|20 (same). Although the court of appeals did not reach
step three, it followed this Court's and the Supreme Court's guidance and held step three
is a question of fact reviewed for clear error. See Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at f 16.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the court of appeals' decision. If this Court reverses the
court of appeals' decision, however, it should remand to the court of appeals for
consideration of Valdez's arguments regarding the admissibility of BWS evidence.
Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at ^17 n.2; s_ee. Pet. Br. at 39.
SUBMITTED this Id** day of June, 2005.

"TTORI J. sEPpr""^

Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
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instant case because the two jurors were not
challenged by counsel.15 Similarly, Utah
Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(14) provides, with our emphasis, that "[n]o person
may serve as a juror, if challenged, unless
the judge is convinced the juror can and will
act impartially and fairly." We disagree that
the lack of a challenge obviates the problem
in this case. Woolley and rule 18(e)(14) presuppose that the trial court has fulfilled its
duty to detect and investigate the potential
for partiality so that counsel has the opportunity to intelligently and effectively exercise
challenges to jurors. Clearly, a juror cannot
be challenged for cause until there is a basis
for the challenge. The trial court's obligation in this regard is essentially independent of counsel's actions. "[T]rial judges
[must] take care to adequately and completely probe jurors on all possible issues of bias,"
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798 (Utah
1991), so that the basis for challenges can be
discovered.16 Only with that information on
the table is counsel's duty to make appropriate challenges triggered.
1126 For the same reason, while the State
is correct that Defendant neither attempted
to have the jurors in question removed for
cause, nor used a peremptory strike, the rule
of State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah
1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115, 115 S.Ct.
910,130 L.Ed.2d 792 (1995), "a case in which
the Utah Supreme Court imposed a requirement for demonstrating prejudice in a related context," Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App
152,1131, 71 P.3d 601, is inapplicable. Because the trial court did not fulfill its obligation to fully probe the jurors about their
potential prejudice, "the proceedings did not
advance to the point at which, as in Menzies,
a
dispute arose over whether the trial court
should have granted a challenge for cause."
Id. at 132.

CONCLUSION
1127 When there is a specific reason to
doubt a prospective juror's impartiality,
sound discretion requires the trial court (or
counsel, at the court's invitation) to question
the juror so the court can meaningfully evaluate whether the juror will act impartially.
Such did not occur in this case with respect
to two jurors who served, and, accordingly,
we reverse Defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial.17
1128 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M.
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge and NORMAN
H. JACKSON, Judge.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Anthony James VALDEZ, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 20030089-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 24, 2004.
Background: Defendant was convicted in
the District Court, Third District, Salt
Lake Department, Judith S. Atherton, J.,
of aggravated burglary, possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person,
and criminal mischief. Defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Jackson,
J.,: held that:
(1) defendant's alleged failure to timely
present Batson challenge did not pre-

15. Given our resolution of this case, it is unnecessary to address Defendant's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.

Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983)), cert,
denied, 11 P.3d 338 (Utah 2003).

**• "The purpose for this probing is to facilitate
both the detection of actual bias and the collection of data to permit informed exercise of the
Peremptory challenge.' " Depew v. Sullivan, 2003
U
T App 152,112, 71 P.3d 601 (quoting State v.

17. "In light of our decision to remand for a new
trial, it is not necessary to discuss [Defendant's]
other alleged errors." Id. at H 40 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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vent district court from addressing
challenge or result in waiver;
(2) defendant's objections to state's use of
peremptory challenges preserved Batson claim for appeal, although he did
not challenge validity of prosecutor's
explanations;
(3) Court of Appeals reviewed trial court's
determination for abuse of discretion;
and
(4) prosecutor failed to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
using peremptory challenges to strike
only women.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Jury <s>117
Defendant's alleged failure to timely
present Batson challenge by failing to raise it
until after the venire had been dismissed, the
jury had been sworn in, and the court preliminarily instructed the jury did not prevent
district court from addressing challenge or
result in waiver; rather, court impliedly
found good cause to allow challenge to state's
peremptory strikes beyond usual limits by
ignoring state's timeliness argument and requiring the parties to proceed directly to
arguments on the merits. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 14; Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 18(c)(2).
2. Jury <s=>117
Under Batson, a challenge to a peremptory strike must be timely. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 14.
3. Criminal Law @=>1028
Issues not raised in the trial court in
timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding the appellate court from considering their
merits on appeal.
4. Criminal Law <S=*1035(5)
What constitutes a timely challenge under Batson depends entirely upon local procedures, but only firmly established and
regularly followed state procedure may be
interposed by a State to prevent subsequent
appellate review of the important constitutional claim. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.

5. Jury <S>117
A district court may consider a defendant's Batson challenge beyond the dismissal
of the venire, even if it has made no specific
finding of good cause; so long as it allows
counsel to proceed with their Batson arguments, the district court impliedly finds good
cause to consider the constitutional claim,
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; Rules Crim.Proc.,
Rule 18(c)(2).
6. Criminal Law <S=>1035(5)
Court of Appeals could not prevent appellate review of defendant's Batson claim
due to lack of timeliness even if court agreed
that Batson challenges were prohibited after
the venire has been dismissed and the jury
has been sworn, as proposed rule was not
firmly established and regularly followed
state procedure. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14;
Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 18(c)(2).
7. Criminal Law <3=>1035(5)
Defendant's objections to state's use of
peremptory challenges preserved Batsv^
claim for appeal, although he did not challenge the validity of the prosecutor's explanations for the strikes. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend.
14.
8. Criminal Law <3=>1030(1)
To ensure the trial court's opportunity V)
consider an issue, appellate review of criminal cases in Utah requires that a contemporaneous objection or some form of specific
preservation of claims of error must be madd
a part of the trial court record.
9. Criminal Law <3=>1043(1)
In Utah, there is no clear rule requiring
a defendant to renew a Batson objection or
to object specifically to the state's offered
explanations; rather, Utah courts do not require a party to continue to object once a
motion has been made, and the trial court
has rendered a decision on the issue,
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
10. Criminal Law <S=>1152(2)
Court of Appeals considered defendant's
Batson challenge one of discretion with the
trial court and reviewed trial court's determination for abuse of that discretion; issue of
whether the prosecutor offered a legitimate,
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nondiscriminatory reason for peremptory
strikes was less like a factual issue, because
the trial court did not weigh evidence, but
instead looked to the face of the state's explanations. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
11. Jury <^33(5.15)
The first step of the tripartite process
for determining whether the prosecution has
engaged in prohibited discrimination in the
jury selection process requires that a defendant challenging the prosecutor's use of a
peremptory challenge present a prima facie
case of discrimination.
12. Criminal Law «>1152(2)
A trial court's determination that a defendant has presented a prima facie case of
discrimination in jury selection is a matter of
some discretion on the part of the trial court,
and will only be reversed if the trial court
has abused its discretion.
13. Criminal Law <S>1152(2)
The Court of Appeals allows the trial
court discretion in making the determination
whether, in the context of the specific case, a
defendant has presented a prima facie case
of discrimination in jury selection.

17. Jury ^33(5.15)
Under the second step of the three-step
test to determine whether, pursuant to Batson, the prosecutor has engaged in prohibited discrimination during the jury selection
process, even suspect explanations must be
deemed facially valid unless they are inherently discriminatory.
U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 14.
18. Jury <S=>33(5.15)
Although the Batson challenge step requiring the prosecutor to give an explanation
following a prima facie case of discrimination
does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible, it does require the
proponent of the peremptory challenge to
come forward with a neutral explanation for
the challenge. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 14.
19. Jury <S>33(5.15)
Under Batson, the reason for a peremptory strike must be related to the case being
tried. U.S.CA. Const.Amend. 14.
20. Jury ®=>33(5.15)
Under Batson, the reason for a peremptory strike must be clear and reasonably
specific. U.S.CA. Const.Amend. 14.

14. Jury e=>33(5.15)
The third step of the tripartite process
for determining whether the prosecution engaged in prohibited discrimination during the
jury selection process requires the trial court
to weigh the evidence and look beyond the
explanation, if possible, to determine whether
the strike was purposefully discriminatory.

21. Jury ^33(5.15)
Under Batson, a prosecutor is required
to articulate a neutral explanation related to
the particular case, giving a clear, concise
and reasonably specific legitimate explanation for excusing those jurors; there must
also be support in the record for such an
explanation. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 14.

15. Criminal Law <2>1158(3)
The trial court's actions in weighing the
evidence and looking beyond the explanation
for a peremptory strike during jury selection
to determine whether the strike was purposefully discriminatory is intensely factual,
and thus is reviewed for clear error.

22. Jury ®=>33(5.15)
Prosecutor failed to articulate legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for using peremptory challenges to strike only women; state
did not provide any basis for explanations
that some jurors were "overly compassionate" or "matter of fact," state cited vague
nondiscriminatory motives without tying motives to jurors themselves, and some of
state's explanations were unrelated to case at
hand. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 14.

16. Jury e=>33(5.15)
Pursuant to Batson, Utah courts apply a
three-step test to determine whether the
prosecutor has engaged in prohibited discrimination during the jury selection process;
this test equally applies in cases of gender
discrimination. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.

23. Jury <S>33(5.15)
In order to survive a Batson challenge,
it is not enough for the prosecutor simply to
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describe a nondiscriminatory motive without
tying it to something specific about the juror
herself. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
24. Jury <3=>33(5.15)
If the prosecutor cites demeanor as a
reason for striking a juror, courts considering a Batson challenge should apply particularly careful scrutiny, because such after-thefact rationalizations are susceptible to abuse.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
25. Juiy <s=>33(5.15)
Unless the neutral explanation offered
by the state for a peremptory strike may, on
its face, be tied to the issues, evidence, and
context of the case at hand, the explanation
will not be considered legitimate; rather, the
court reviewing a Batson challenge will consider the explanation mere pretext as a matter of law, unrelated as it is to the reality of
the proceedings before the district court.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
John D. O'Connell Jr. and Lori Seppi, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and Christine Soltis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
for Appellee.
Before BILLINGS, P.J., GREENWOOD
and JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
111 Anthony James Valdez appeals convictions for aggravated burglary, a first-degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated
section 76-6-203 (2002); possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated section 76-10-503(2)(a) (2002);
and criminal mischief, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-106 (2002)." We reverse and remand.

the district court conducted voir dire to select a jury for Valdez's trial. Following the
jury selection, Valdez objected to the State's
use of its peremptory challenges under Bcfe
son v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct 1712,
90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In order to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination
under Batson, Valdez's counsel noted that
the State used all four of its peremptory
challenges to exclude women from the jury.
Valdez further noted that in a domestic vio<
lence jury trial, gender issues tend to be
highly charged. Ultimately, he argued, the
State's exclusion of only women from the
jury cannot be disregarded, on its face, in the
context of this case.
H 3 The State did not argue that Valdez
had failed to present a prima facie case of
discrimination, but instead argued Valdez's
Batson challenge was untimely. Without addressing the timeliness of Valdez's challenge*
the district court, ordered the State to explain
its challenges. The State explained its challenges as follows:
[T]he State chose to strike Ms. Valerio
because she stated that she worked for a
nonprofit brain injury type of place. That
is not a basis upon which to strike her [for
cause], but I felt her responses lined up in
a way that would make her not a helpful
[juror] for the State and that she would be
somewhat overly compassionate.
The second [juror] was Ms. Gonzalez,
She had heard of the case and seemed—
though she said that it wouldn't bother
her, her responses to me seemed matter of
fact and I felt like her responses would not
make her a good juror for the State.

BACKGROUND

Ms. Thornton had also heard of the case
and I don't recall what it was, there was
something that I immediately decided thaf
I would make her one of my strikes
She'd also been on a jury and he was found
guilty of a manslaughter, which I thought"
was probably a one-step reduction, at least
that's the assumption. So again, I felt like
she was not going to be a helpful one foe
the State.

H 2 Valdez was prosecuted for various domestic violence charges, including the violent
crimes listed above. On October 29, 2002,

The last one I agonized over whether>t»
strike, No. 19, Paul[a] Morely or 21 RoS
Hardy, I conferred with my colleague, ..&
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and we talked about it and she brought to
my attention he was a hunter and that she
felt like a hunter would know things about
guns and brought that point about that
potential juror and another one. And after
conferring with her I changed my mind
and went with [herl—and that was simply—she was simply towards the end. I
suppose there was also it felt like she was
not strong, not—I'm sorry, Fm trying to
read my notes here
There was this pattern of—her responses made me think she would be somebody,
again, that might be willing to let bygones
be bygones, what I would say overly compassionate, and it was just based on her
responses about position, her responses to
little subtle things like her teaching piano
lessons and the magazines she chose. We
don't have a lot to base these things on, so
that's how I made those choices.

peremptory strike must be timely. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99-100, 106
S.Ct. 1712, 1724-25, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)
(allowing for local timeliness rules to bar
Batson challenges); Salt Lake County v.
Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah CtApp.
1989) (stating, in context of Batson challenge,
"[i]t is axiomatic that, before a party may
advance an issue on appeal, the record must
clearly show that it was timely presented to
the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon"). "Issues not raised in
the trial court in timely fashion are deemed
waived, precluding this court from considering their merits on appeal." Carlston, 776
P.2d at 655. What constitutes a timely challenge under Batson depends entirely upon
local procedures, see id.; Ford v. Georgia,
498 U.S. 411, 423, 111 S.Ct. 850, 857, 112
L.Ed.2d 935 (1991), but only " 'firmly established and regularly followed state [procedure]' may be interposed by a State to prevent subsequent [appellate] review" of this
important constitutional claim. Id. at 42324, 111 S.Ct. at 857 (citation omitted).

(First alteration in original.) Ultimately, the
district court accepted the State's explanations and overruled Valdez's objection.
114 During the jury trial, the victim recant118 Valdez waited to raise his Batson chaled her accusation against Valdez. The State
called an expert in Battered Women Syn- lenge until after the venire had been disdrom (BWS) to explain why many victims of missed, the jury had been sworn in, and the
abuse recant their accusation against their court preliminarily instructed the jury. The
abuser. Valdez objected to the testimony, State refers us to several other jurisdictions
but the district court overruled the objection. that require a Batson challenge to be raised
The jury found Valdez guilty of aggravated no later than "in the period between the
burglary, possession of a dangerous weapon selection of the jurors and the administration
by a restricted person, and criminal mischief. of their oaths." Id. at 422, 111 S.Ct. at 857;
see also Carlston, 776 P.2d at 655-56 (citing
Valdez appeals.
favorably, in dicta, several jurisdictions that
require Batson challenge to be raised prior
ANALYSIS
to dismissing venire). The reason for bar115 Valdez challenges the district court's ring a Batson challenge after the jury is
ruling that the State offered nondiscriminato- sworn in has been variously stated as follows:
ry reasons for its use of peremptory strikes.
The "timely objection" rule is designed to
prevent defendants from "sandbagging"
I. Procedural Issues
the prosecution by waiting until trial has
116 As a preliminary matter, the State
concluded unsatisfactorily before insisting
raises two threshold procedural issues that,
on an explanation for jury strikes that by
according to the State, bar appellate review
then the prosecutor may largely have forof Valdez's challenges.
gotten. Furthermore, prosecutorial misconduct is easily remedied prior to comA. Timeliness
mencement of trial simply by seating the
wrongfully struck venireperson. After tri[1-4] 117 First, the State contends Valdez
al, the only remedy is setting aside the
did not raise his Batson challenge in a timely
conviction.
manner. Under Batson, a challenge to a
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Id. at 656 (citations omitted); see also People
[6] Ull However, even if we adopted the
v. Holder, 153 IlLApp.3d 884, 106 Ill.Dec. State's position, we could not "interpose[ ]" it
700, 506 N.E.2d 407, 408 (1987) (stating waiv- "to prevent subsequent [appellate] review" in
er rule enforced "so as not to allow a defen- this case. Ford, 498 U.S. at 424, 111 S.Ct at
dant to object to that which he has ac- 857. The rule the State proposes, which
quiesced in" throughout trial).
would prohibit Batson challenges after the
venire has been dismissed and the jury has
119 Furthermore, the State argues, this
been sworn, has not heretofore been a
rule is consistent with Utah Rule of Criminal
" 'firmly established and regularly followed
Procedure 18(c)(2), which provides "[a] chalstate [procedure].' " Id at 423, 111 S.Ct. at
lenge to an individual juror may be made
857 (1991) (citations omitted). At best, this
only before the jury is sworn . . . except the
rule could be gleaned by analogy and implicourt may, for good cause, permit it to be
cation from Hanison and rule 18. However,
made after the juror is sworn but before any
rule 18 itself allows Batson challenges at a
of the evidence is presented." In State v.
later time than the State's proposed rule,
Harrison, the Utah Supreme Court applied
because it allows challenges "before any of
rule 18's good cause provision to review an
the evidence is presented." Utah R.Crim. P.
untimely Batson challenge. See 805 P.2d
18(c)(2). Thus, in the absence of any firmer
769, 776 (Utah 1991). However, in that case
and more established authority on the subthe challenge was "made and argued immediject, we could not prevent appellate review of
ately after the jury was sworn in, before the
Valdez's constitutional claim due to lack of
challenged jurors were excused from service,
timeliness.1
and before opening statements of counsel."
Id. This is significant, the State maintains,
B. Preservation
because once the venire and the challenged
[7,8] 1112 Second, the State argues Valjurors have been dismissed, the remedy of
dez
failed to preserve his objection to the
reinstating the wrongly challenged juror is
State's
explanation for the strikes. Specifino longer available. Thus, under the State's
cally,
Valdez
did not challenge the validity of
argument, Harrison represents the "outside
limit" in Utah to timely raising a Batson the prosecutor's explanations for the strikes.
Consequently, the State argues, Valdez is
challenge.
precluded from attacking the State's explanations for the first time on appeal. "[T]0
[5] 1110 However, under Harrison, a disensure the trial court's opportunity to considtrict court may consider a defendant's Bater an issue, appellate review of criminal cases
son challenge beyond the dismissal of the
in Utah requires 'that a contemporaneous
venire, even if it has made no specific finding
objection or some form of specific preservaof good cause pursuant to rule 18 of the Utah
tion of claims of error must be made a part
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 805 P.2d
of the trial court record.' " State v. Brown,
at 776. So long as it "allowfs] counsel to
856 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting
proceed with their [Batson ] arguments," the State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah
district court impliedly finds good cause un- 1987)).
der rule 18 to consider the constitutional
[9] 1113 We are persuaded by Valdez,
claim. Id. In this case, the district court did
however,
that his initial objection to the
just that by ignoring the State's timeliness
argument and requiring the parties to pro- State's use of peremptory challenges to
ceed directly to arguments on the merits. strike women from the jury constituted suffiThus, the district court impliedly found good cient preservation of his constitutional claim
cause under rule 18 to allow a challenge to Ford v. Georgia held that an appellate court
the State's peremptory strikes beyond the cannot prevent review by applying a "rule
unannounced at the time of petitioner's trial."
usual limits.
1. This issue would best be addressed by an
amendment to the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. This opinion should not be read as a

comment, positive or negative, on the appropri-"
ateness of the rule the State proposes.
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498 U.S. 411, 424, 111 S.Ct. 850, 858, 112
[11-13] 1115 The challenge at issue inL.Ed.2d 935 (1991). In Utah, there is no volves the second step of a tripartite process
clear rule requiring a defendant to renew a for determining whether the prosecution has
Batson objection or to object specifically to engaged in prohibited discrimination in the
the State's offered explanations. Rather, jury selection process. See Chatwin, 2002
Utah courts do "not require a party to con- UT App 363 at 11 7, 58 P.3d 867. The first
tinue to object once a motion has been made, step of that test requires that a defendant
and the trial court has rendered a decision on challenging the prosecutor's use of a perempthe issue." State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT tory challenge must present a prima facie
4,1114, 20 P.3d 265. Here, Valdez objected to case of discrimination. See id A trial
the State's use of peremptory challenges, court's determination that a defendant has
thereby preventing any claim that he strate- presented a prima facie case of discriminagically hid his objection until after obtaining tion is a matter of some discretion on the
an unsatisfactory result, which seems to be part of the trial court, and we will only
the State's strongest objection to Valdez's reverse that determination where the trial
challenge.
court has abused its discretion. See State v.
Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 456 (Utah 1994). The
II. Issue and Standard of Review
purpose for allowing the trial court some
[10] 1i 14 Valdez specifically challenges discretion in determining whether the defenthe district court's ruling that the State of- dant has presented a prima facie case of
fered a nondiscriminatory reason for its use discrimination was stated by the Utah Suof peremptory strikes. We are unaware of preme Court as follows:
any cases properly applying an appropriate
The abuse of discretion standard of review
standard of review for such challenges.
is particularly appropriate to this quesState v. Chatwin appears to set forth a
tion
[T]he United States Supreme
"clearly erroneous" standard of review for
Court was reluctant to define in detail
such challenges. See 2002 UT App 363,115,
what
facts will raise an inference of dis58 P.3d 867. "Chatwin argues that the proscrimination.
Likewise, we have not articuecution's stated reason for striking the polated
specific
factors that amount to a
tential juror was not neutral and constituted
"strong
likelihood"
that minority jurors
illegal discrimination
Absent a showing
were challenged because of their racial or
of clear error, we will not overturn a trial
ethnic group membership. By according
court's determination concerning the disdiscretion to the trial court in this area, we
criminatory intent embodied in a party's expermit
"experience to accumulate at the
planation for the exercise of a peremptory
r
low
est
court
level" until we "see more
challenge." Id. To establish the clearly erroclearly what factors are important to [the]
neous standard of review in the step two
decision and how to take them into accontext, however, Chatwin cited, without
count."
analysis, State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,?5, 41 P.3d 1153. That case set forth the See id. at 456 n. 3 (citations omitted). What
clearly erroneous standard of review in the may constitute a prima facie showing of disstep three context, and is inapplicable here. crimination in the context of one case may
Chatwin went further, however, and decided not constitute a showing of discrimination in
the step two question as a matter of law, the context of another case. This is so berather than applying the clearly erroneous cause each case may turn on different issues,
standard it previously set forth. Here, our or even subtly different nuances. Thus, we
decision will analyze and clarify the appro- allow the trial court discretion in making the
priate standard of review for step two chal- determination whether, in the context of the
lenges. Accordingly, we must determine the specific case, a defendant has presented a
a
Ppropriate standard of review, relying on prima facie case of discrimination.
analogy to other standards of review applicable in cases involving alleged discrimination
[14,15] 1116 The third step of the triparHI the voir dire process.
tite process for determining whether the
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prosecution engaged in prohibited discrimination during the jury selection process requires the trial court to weigh the evidence
and "look beyond the explanation, if possible,
to determine whether the strike was purposefully discriminatory." Chatwin, 2002
UT App 363 at 117, 58 P.3d 867. More than
being dependant on the particular issues,
circumstances and nuances of a particular
case, this determination requires the trial
court to delve into a weighing of the evidence
and the credibility of the prosecutor. See
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365,
111 S.Ct. 1859, 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991).
This is an intensely factual determination, see
State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,1113, 41
P.3d 1153, and we thus review the trial
court's factual findings for clear error. See
State v. Jensen, 2003 UT App 273,117, 76
P.3d 188.

trial court's determination for abuse of that
discretion.2

2. Because Valdez's step two challenge constitutes a sufficient basis to reverse, we do not
reach his alternate step three argument. Further, we do not reach Valdez's arguments regarding the admissibility of Battered Woman

Syndrome evidence within the context of this
case. See State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 919
(Utah 1998) (holding where one argument
dispositive of the appeal, we need not address the
defendant's remaining arguments).

III. Batson and its Progeny

1118 Valdez claims the State engaged ifc
impermissible gender discrimination during
the selection of the jury. In Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court held
that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution governs the use of peremptory
challenges by prosecutors in criminal trials:
See 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d
69 (1986). In Batson, the United States
Supreme Court stated that although a defendant has "no right to a 'petit jury composed
in whole or in part of persons of his own
race,' " id. at 85, 106 S.Ct. at 1717 (citation
omitted), a "defendant does have the right'to
be tried by a jury whose members are select1117 In our view, the issue involved here, ed pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria/!
whether the prosecutor offered a legitimate, Id. at 85-86, 106 S.Ct. at 1717. In J.E.B. v.
nondiscriminatory reason for the peremptory Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128
strikes, is closely analogous to the step one L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), the United States Su^
issue. It seems less like a factual issue preme Court extended the holding of Batsm
because the trial court does not weigh evi- to protect litigants from gender discriminadence, but instead looks to the face of the tion in the jury selection process: "We haye
State's explanations. See Chatwin, 2002 UT recognized that . . . litigants . . . have an
App 363 at H 7, 58 P.3d 867 (stating prosecu- equal protection right to jury selection procetor's explanation "must be, at the very least, dures that are free from state-sponsored
facially neutral" (emphasis added)). The tri- group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of,
We hold that gender,
al court's examination of the facial neutrality historical prejudice
of the State's explanation also considers the like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for>
general context of the case and the specific juror competence and impartiality." 7d,at
issues involved, see id. (stating prosecutor's 128-29,114 S.Ct. at 1421.
The litigants are harmed by the risk that
explanation "must be . . . related to the case
the prejudice that motivated the discrimibeing tried"), similar to the way the trial
natory selection of the jury will infect thfc
court considers whether the defendant has
entire proceedings
presented a prima facie case of discriminaWhen state actors exercise peremptory
tion. See Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 455-56. Inchallenges in reliance on gender stereodeed, the district court's consideration of the
types, they ratify and reinforce prejudicial
context of the case is an indispensable porviews of the relative abilities of men alia
tion of the step two analytic framework, as
women. Because these stereotypes have
we will discuss below. Thus, steps one and
wreaked injustice in so many other
two in the analytical process appear to be
analytic reciprocals. Accordingly, it is apspheres of our country's public life, activfe
propriate to consider this issue one of discrediscrimination by litigants on the basis d
tion with the trial court and to review the
gender during jury selection "invites cyni-*
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cism respecting the jury's neutrality and
its obligation to adhere to the law." The
potential for cynicism is particularly acute
in cases where gender-related issues are
prominent, such as cases involving rape,
sexual harassment, or paternity. Discriminatory use of peremptory challenges may
create the impression that the judicial system has acquiesced in suppressing full participation by one gender or that the "deck
has been stacked" in favor of one side.
Id. at 140, 114 S.Ct. at 1427 (citations omitted).
[16] 1119 Pursuant to Batson, Utah
courts apply a three-step test to determine
whether the prosecutor has engaged in prohibited discrimination during the jury selection process. See State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d
517, 518 (Utah 1989) (applying three-step
test to question of racial discrimination).
This test equally applies in cases of gender
discrimination. See State v. Jensen, 2003 UT
App 273,1113, 76 P.3d 188 (applying threestep test to question of gender discrimination). We have stated the test as follows:
"[0]nce the opponent of a peremptory
challenge has made out a prima facie case
of [gender] discrimination (step 1), the burden of production shifts to the proponent
of the strike to come forward with a [gender]-neutral explanation (step 2). If a
[gender]-neutral explanation is tendered,
the trial court must then decide (step 3)
whether the opponent of the strike has
proved purposeful [gender] discrimination."

tory." State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,1110, 41 P.3d 1153; see also Hernandez v.
New York 500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859,
1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) ("Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be
deemed [gender] neutral"). Although this
step "does not demand an explanation that is
persuasive, or even plausible," Purkett v.
Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68, 115 S.Ct. 1769,
1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995), it does "require[ ] the proponent of the peremptory
challenge, the prosecutor in this case, to
come forward with a [gender]-neutral explanation for the challenge." Colwell 2000 UT
8 at 1117, 994 P.2d 177. Utah courts have
enumerated a number of factors that must be •
considered within the context of the case at
hand to determine whether the prosecution
has offered a legitimate explanation:
The second step [of the analysis] requires
"the prosecutor to come forward with a
race-neutral explanation for the challenge."
This step "does not demand an explanation
that is persuasive, or even plausible." So
long as the reasons given are " '(1) neutral,
(2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear
and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate,' " " 'the reason[s] offered will be
deemed race neutral.'"
Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at 119, 41 P.3d 1153
(citations omitted).

1122 The courts have been instructive in
defining and applying each of these factors.
For example, in Hidalgo v. Fagen, Inc., the
Id. at 1113 (quoting State v. Colwell, 2000 UT Tenth Circuit was asked to decide whether a
8,1117, 994 P.2d 177 (other citation omitted)) defendant's explanation for a peremptory
strike was facially neutral. See 206 F.3d
(alterations in original).
H 20 In the State's brief, it concedes that it 1013, 1018 (10th Cir.2000). In that case, the
waived the issue of whether Valdez present- defendant struck a Hispanic woman from the
ed a prima facie case of discrimination. See venire, explaining that it was because of her
Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at 1118, 994 P.2d 177 youth. See id. The court, looking specifical(stating prosecution must challenge sufficien- ly at the facial validity of the defendant's
cy of prima facie case before providing rebut- explanation, concluded the strike was neutal explanation for strike, or issue is waived). tral, holding: "A neutral explanation means
Thus, we examine only step two of the analy- an explanation based on something besides
the race of the juror
Unless discriminasis.
tory intent is inherent in the justification, the
[17,18] 1121 Under this step, even "sus- reason offered will be deemed race neutral."
pect" explanations must be deemed "facially Id. at 1019. Such a rationale is similarly
valid" unless they are "inherently discrimina- applied to show gender neutrality.
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1123 The "legitimate" factor is closely related to the "neutral" factor. As this court
has noted, the Supreme Court has provided
guidance in determining whether the reason
for a peremptory strike is legitimate: " *a
"legitimate reason" is not a reason that
makes sense, but a reason that does not deny
equal protection; " State v. Merrill, 928 P.2d
401, 404 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (citation omitted). For example, in Merrill the defendant
claimed that the reason the prosecutor gave
for his peremptory challenge was not legitimate. See id. The prosecutor had dismissed a potential juror who was Asian. See
id. at 402. The reason for the dismissal, the
prosecutor explained, was because he feared
the potential juror would be biased against
law enforcement due to a recent speeding
ticket. See id. We concluded that was a
legitimate explanation because it "does not
deny a potential juror equal protection." Id.
at 404.
[19] 1124 The reason for a peremptory
strike must also be related to the case being
tried. In State v. Cantu, a prosecutor's reason for a peremptory strike of a Hispanic
potential juror was invalidated in part because it was unrelated to the juror or the
case. See 778 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1989).
The prosecutor's proffered reason for the
strike was because he was angry with defense counsel. See id. The Utah Supreme
Court held that this explanation was desultory, and thus insufficient to fulfill the Batson
requirement that peremptory strikes must be
based upon grounds reasonably related to
the case at bar. See id.
[20,21] H25 Finally, the reason for a
peremptory strike must be clear and reasonably specific. This factor prevents a prosecutor from merely denying the existence of a
discriminatory motive or by generally proclaiming good faith, ensuring that equal protection will not become a "vain and illusory
requirement." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1724, 90 L.Ed.2d 69
(1986). Rather, it requires the prosecutor
"to articulate a neutral explanation related to
the particular case, giving a clear, concise
and reasonably specific legitimate explanation for excusing those jurors." New Mexico
v. Aragon, 109 N.M. 197, 784 P.2d 16, 21

(1989). There must also be support in the
record for such an explanation. See State v.
Macial 854 P.2d 543, 547 (Utah Ct.Appl
1993). For example, in Aragon, the prosecutor struck two prospective jurors who were
black because they were possibly related to
the defendant. See 784 P.2d at 17. The
New Mexico Supreme Court noted that nothing in the record showed the prosecutor had
any basis for his opinion that the potential
jurors might be untrustworthy, other than
his own statement of their possible bloocj
relationship. See id. As a result, the court
ruled that "[t]he prosecutor's explanation
was hardly 'a clear, concise, and reasonably
specific explanation for excusing those jurors.' " Id. at 21 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court. See
id.
IV. Valdez's Batson Challenge
[22,23] H 26 With that analytical framework in mind, we approach Valdez's step two
challenge. Valdez's argument that the
State's peremptory challenges violated equal
protection is persuasive. Specifically, Valdez
argues that the State's reason for using peremptory challenges to strike only women was
not reasonably clear or specific. As in Anogo% there is little in the record to demonstrate that the State had any basis for its
strikes of these four women. For example,
as Valdez aptly notes, the State explains that
Jurors Morely and Valerio were "overly compassionate" and Gonzalez was "matter of
fact" without providing any clear basis for its
opinions other than these cursory descriptions. Further, the prosecutor stated vaii?
ously "I felt her responses lined up in a way
that would make her not a helpful witness for
the S t a t e — [H]er responses to me seemed
matter of fact and I felt like her responses
would not make her a good juror for the
S t a t e — I don't recall what it was [about
Ms. Thornton], there was something that
immediately decided that I would make hca
one of my strikes." These explanations afl
fall short of being reasonably clear and sp#
cific. It is not enough for the prosecutoi
simply to describe a nondiscriminatory mo*
tive without tying it to something specific
about the juror herself. See United States it
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Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir.1989)
(holding prosecutor's explanation that he
struck juror because "I just got a feeling
about him" "obviously [fell] short" of being
reasonably clear and specific).
[24] 1127 If the prosecutor cites demeanor as a reason for striking a juror, courts
should apply "particularly careful scrutiny"
because "such after-the-fact rationalizations
are susceptible to abuse." Brown, v. Kelly,
973 F.2d 116, 121 (2nd Cir.1992). Although
not required, prosecutors "would be well advised
to make contemporaneous notes as
to the specific behavior on the prospective
juror's part that renders such person unsuitable for service on a particular case." Id. In
this case, however, the State was hardly
clear, concise, or reasonably specific in its
explanations. It offered nothing more than
vague and generic descriptions of the jurors
that anyone would concede are nondiscriminatory, but which do not appear to have
anything to do with the jurors themselves.
This is not sufficient to satisfy our equal
protection jurisprudence, and is sufficient in
itself to reverse the trial court's treatment of
the State's peremptory strike.
1128 In addition to not being reasonably
clear and specific, some of the State's explanations were unrelated to the case at hand.
For example, the State struck Thornton because she had been on a jury that had found
a defendant, who had been charged with
murder, guilty of manslaughter. As Valdez
correctly notes, other than being a criminal
offense, manslaughter has nothing to do with
the present case. Valdez was not charged
with manslaughter or any other lesser-included offenses. Furthermore, Thornton's
participation on a jury that convicted another
defendant of manslaughter does not undermine her ability to be impartial in the present case.

see 2002 UT App 18,119, 41 P.3d 1153, and
analyzed above. Unless the neutral explanation offered by the State may, on its face, be
tied to the issues, evidence, and context of
the case at hand, the explanation will not be
considered legitimate. Rather, we will consider the explanation mere pretext as a matter of law, unrelated as it is to the reality of
the proceedings before the district court.
1130 Were we to hold otherwise, we would
sanction the use of fanciful and spurious explanations for even the most sinister discriminatory motives. Without the requirement
that the explanation at least have, on its face,
a grounding in the context of the case itself,
racist or sexist motives could more easily be
masked by unrelated but inherently nondiscriminatory explanations. In such a case,
the district court would have no need to
proceed to step three to plumb the depths of
the prosecutor's motivations because the
State had offered nothing concrete by way of
explanation. See State v. Chativin, 2002 UT
App 363,1! 20, 58 P.3d 867 (holding State did
not offer legitimate step two explanation, obviating the need to proceed to step three).
This is just such a case. The prosecutor's
explanations had no clear and specific basis
in the case at hand. Thus, we hold it was an
abuse of the district court's discretion to
determine the explanations were nondiscriminatory and to proceed to step three.
CONCLUSION
11 31 The State's peremptory strikes should
have been invalidated by the trial court because the State failed to offer facially legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanations. The
explanations were neither clear and specific
nor related to the case being tried. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

1132 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M.
[25] U29 The State argues in its brief BILLINGS, Presiding Judge and PAMELA
that these explanations were not inherently T. GREENWOOD, Judge.
discriminatory because nothing in the expla
nations themselves pointed directly to the
sorts of invidious stereotypes the law conKEY NUMBER SYSTEM
^HA>Vy
demns. While this may be true, the test for
determining the legitimacy and facial nni
trality of an explanation in the Batson context is the list of factors outlined in Cannon,

£

ADDENDUM B

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1. [Citizenship
protection.]

Due process of law — Equal

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

1

Representative
ment,]

Power to reduce appoint-

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3

[Disqualification to hold office.]

No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.
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The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
provisions of this article.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 18. Selection of jury.
(a) The judge shall determine the method of selecting the jury and notify the
parties at a pretrial conference or otherwise prior to trial. The following
procedures for selection are not exclusive.
(a)(1) Strike and replace method. The court shall summon the number of the
jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for
any alternates, for all peremptory challenges permitted, and for all challenges
for cause granted. At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in
random order. The judge may hear and determine challenges for cause during
the course of questioning or at the end thereof. The judge may and, at the
request of any party, shall hear and determine challenges for cause outside the
hearing of the jurors. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror
shall be called to fill the vacancy, and any such new juror may be challenged for
cause. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall provide a
list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the prosecution,
shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular
turn, as the court may direct, until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or
waived. The clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as
shall be necessary to constitute the jury, including any alternate jurors, and
the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. If alternate
jurors have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless
otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire.
(a)(2) Struck method. The court shall summon the number of jurors that are
to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for any
alternates, for all peremptory challenges permitted and for all challenges for
cause granted. At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in
random order. The judge may hear and determine challenges for cause during
the course of questioning or at the end thereof. The judge may and, at the
request of any party, shall hear and determine challenges for cause outside the
hearing of the jurors. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk
shall provide a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the
prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a
time in regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived.
The clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be
necessary to constitute the jury, including any alternate jurors, and the
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. If alternate jurors
have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless
otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire.
(a)(3) In courts using lists of prospective jurors generated in random order
by computer, the clerk mav call the iurors in that random order.

(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examination of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the
latter event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the
examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit
to the prospective jurors additional questions requested by counsel or the
defendant. Prior to examining the jurors, the court may make a preliminary
statement of the case. The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to
make a preliminary statement of the case, and notify the parties in advance of
trial.
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror
(c)(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or for
the trial of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection made to
all jurors summoned and may be taken by either party.
(c)(l)(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material
departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, drawing, summoning and return of the panel.
(c)(l)(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn
and shall be in writing or made upon the record. It shall specifically set forth
the facts constituting the grounds of the challenge.
(c)(l)(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a
hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon which the challenge is
based. The jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be called as
witnesses at the hearing thereon.
(c)(l)(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the panel
is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial in question is
concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall direct the selection of jurors
to proceed.
(c)(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is
sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be
made after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. In
challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel and hearings
thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall be taken first by the
prosecution and then by the defense.
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory
challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory
challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory
challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the
defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised
separately or jointly.
(e) A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and shall be
heard and determined by the court. The juror challenged and any other person
may be examined as a witness on the hearing of such challenge. A challenge for
cause may be taken on one or more of the following grounds. On its own motion
the court may remove a juror upon the same grounds.
(e)(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law;
(e)(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of
performing the duties of a juror;
(e)(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person
alleged to be injured by the offense charged, nr on whose complaint the
prosecution was instituted;
(e)(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person alleged to
have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when
viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective
juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of

favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because the juror
is indebted to or employed by the state or a political subdivision thereof;
(e)(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil
action, or having complained against or having been accused by the defendant
in a criminal prosecution;
(e)(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment;
(e)(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the
particular offense charged;
(e)(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to trjr the same charge, and
whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict after
the case was submitted to it;
(e)(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the
defendant for the act charged as an offense;
(e)(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of
opinions about the death penalty as would preclude the juror from voting to
impose the death penalty following conviction or would require the juror to
impose the death penalty following conviction regardless of the facts;
(e)(ll) because the juror is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged
or interested in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the carrying
on of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a like offense;
(e)(12) because the juror has been a witness, either for or against the
defendant on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury;
(e)(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or
(e)(14) conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that reasonably lead the court to conclude the juror is not likely to act impartially. No
person may serve as a juror, if challenged, unless the judge is convinced the
juror can and will act impartially and fairly.
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then
by the defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed before
peremptory challenges are taken.
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impaneled. Alternate
jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors who, prior to
the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or disqualified
to perform their duties. The prosecution and defense shall each have one
additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror to be chosen. Alternate jurors shall be selected at the same time and in the same manner, shall
have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and
challenges, shall take the same oath and shall have the same functions,
powers, and privileges as principal jurors. Except in bifurcated proceedings, an
alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged when
the jury retires to consider its verdict. The identity of the alternate jurors may
be withheld until the jurors begin deliberations.
(h) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in
substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try the matter in
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the evidence
and the instructions of the court.
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.)
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copies of the convictions, the sentences in those cases, the
judgments.

Okay.

Did I represent that accurately?

MR, O'CONNELL:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.

All right.

Anything else before we

break?
MR. O'CONNELL:

Yes, Your Honor.

Your Honor, I

noticed that when we were doing the jury selection that the
State struck all women, and that's a basis for a Batson
challenge.
THE COURT:

Not a Batson.

MR. O'CONNELL:

Whatever the follow-up case is that

extended Batson, the gender, and I think at this point all I
need to do is establish that there was a pattern.

And I think

the fact that the State used all of their peremptories on
women -- I don't know if there's any better evidence to show
that there is a pattern of -- based on gender.

I don't think

we had any minorities at all, even Ms. Gonzalez didn't appear
to be Hispanic, so I don't think I'd have any based on race,
but on the fact that the State moved every single one of the
peremptories were based on -THE COURT:

Mr. Burmester?

MR. BURMESTER:
objection is untimely.

Your Honor, I think defense counsel's
We've seated this jury, sworn this

jury, the proper Batson challenge must be made prior to that
point.
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THE COURT:

W e l l , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g that, can y o u give

m e a b a s i s to rebut B a t s o n type
M R . BURMESTER:

challenge?

Y e s , Your Honor

W i t h regard to the

State's n u m b e r o n e , the State c h o s e to strike M s . Valerio
b e c a u s e s h e stated that she w o r k e d for a n o n p r o f i t b r a i n
type of p l a c e .

injury

That is not a b a s i s u p o n w h i c h to strike her,

but I felt h e r r e s p o n s e s lined u p in a w a y that w o u l d m a k e her
not a h e l p f u l w i t n e s s for the State a n d that she w o u l d be
somewhat o v e r l y

compassionate.

The second witness was M s . Gonzalez.

She h a d heard

of the c a s e and seemed -- t h o u g h she said that it w o u l d n ' t
b o t h e r h e r , h e r r e s p o n s e s to m e s e e m e d m a t t e r of fact and 1
felt like h e r r e s p o n s e s w o u l d not m a k e h e r a g o o d juror-for the
State.
M s . T h o r n t o n h a d a l s o h e a r d of the case and I don't
recall w h a t it w a s , there w a s s o m e t h i n g that I

immediately

d e c i d e d that I w o u l d m a k e her o n e of m y s t r i k e s .

She'd also

b e e n o n a jury a n d h e w a s found g u i l t y of a m a n s l a u g h t e r ,
I thought w a s p r o b a b l y a o n e - s t e p r e d u c t i o n , at least
he assumption.

So again

"I ieli

which

that's

like she w a s n o t going to b e

i h e l p f u l o n e for the S t a t e .
T h e last o n e I a g o n i z e d over w h e t h e r to strike,
Jo.
n

*

1 9 , Paul M o r e l y or 21 R o n H a r d y , I c o n f e r r e d w i t h m y

j c o l l e a g u e , M s . -- a n d w e t a l k e d about it and she b r o u g h t to n ,
a t t e n t i o n h e w a s a h u n t e r and that she felt like a h u n t e r w o u l d
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know things about guns and brought that point about that
potential juror and another one.

And after conferring with her

I changed my mind and went with Ms -- and that was simply -she was towards the end.

I suppose there was also it felt like

she was not strong, not -- I'm sorry, I'mi trying to read my
notes here.
THE COURT:

I see.

MR. BURMESTER:

There was this pattern of -- her

responses made me think she would be somebody, again, that
might be willing to let bygones be bygones, what I would say
overly compassionate, and it was just based on her responses
about position, her responses to little subtle things like her
teaching piano lessons and the magazines she chose.

We don't

have a lot to base these things on, so that's how I made those
choices.
THE COURT:

All right.

with your explanation.

Thank you.

And I'm satisfied

I find with regard to peremptory

challenges No. 6, Tamara Thornton, No. 7 Linda Valerio,
No. 10, Joyce Gonzalez, and No. 19, Paula Morely are gender
neutral, they are related specifically to this case.

They were

clearly stated and they are specific and legitimate.

Therefore

I am denying the challenge based on gender.

I also note this

is a jury of four men and four women.
MR. BURMESTER:
THE COURT:

^es, Your Honor.

All right.

Thank you.

Be back in about
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1.

Defendant Did Not Establish a Prima Facie Case of Purposeful
Discrimination.

After each party exercised its four peremptory challenges and the jury was sworn,
defendant's counsel raised a Batson objection to the prosecutors fourth peremptory
challenge against Juror 11, Amador Romero. R. 101: 25-26/ Counsel pointed out that Juror
11 was the only minority of the sixteen prospective jurors from which the jury would be
selected. R. 101:26. He further argued that because Juror 11 was a minority, he would ha\e
"more sympathy" for his client who came "from a lower socioeconomic environment." R.
101: 26. The prosecutor argued that he was not required to provide an explanation for the
strike, contending that defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination.
R. 101: 26-27. Relying solely on the fact that "Romero" is a Hispanic surname, the trial
court found that Juror 11 was a minority. R. 101: 27. The court ruled that "given that fact
alone, Counsel's probably entitled to some explanation as to [the prosecutor's] reasons so
[the court] may then determine whether or n o t . . . it was neutral and not racially charged .
. . ." R. 101: 27. The trial court's conclusion was error.
In the first instance, the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding
that Juror 11 was in fact a minority. As observed by this Court in Bowman, "L'tah courts
have never found a Spanish surname alone sufficient to show minority status unless that
minority status was corroborated by the trial court or the jurors themselves, or wa*
undisputed." 945 P.2d at 156. The record does not support a finding that Juror 11 was a
:

The portion of the transcript containing defendant's Batson objection and the trial
court's ruling thereon is reproduced in Addendum A.
II
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In support of the allegations of Count II, the trial court received certified copies of
judgments of defendant's prior convictions for attempted forgery and attempted unlawful
distribution of a controlled substance, both third degree felonies (R. 124:108-10, State Ex.
7,8).
Defendant's challenge to prosecution strike ofpotential juror
The jury panel consisted of twenty-one persons (Jury List, R. 76-77, attached at
Addendum B). As an aid in the jury selection process, the trial court gave each member of
the jury panel a short written questionaire. The questionaire asked about each potential
juror's work, marital status, education, membership in club and organizations, news source,
i.e., newpapers, radio, or television, and magazine subscriptions (R. 124:2). The trial court
specifically requested that each potential juror "speak loud and clear," to assist the attorneys
in hearing (R. 124:2).4
Matsy Sili, (venireman #3) was the third prospective juror to respond to the court's
questions (R. 124:4). He spoke some words, which were recorded as "inaudible" (R. 124:4).
The trial court said: "Sorry, sir. I can't - - you'll have to speak louder or a little clearer. I
can't understand you" (R. 124:4). Mr. Sili then stated: "I'm Matsy Sili. [inaudible]. My wife
is Mariana. She works for UPS. Just high school, no clubs or [inaudible], USA Today
Newpaper." The court then inquired, "Do you take any magazines?" (R. 124:4). Mr. Sili
answered, "No." The court then further inquired, "What does your wife do for - - is it UPS?

4

The entire jury voir dire is attached at Addendum C.
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Mr. Sili answered, "She works in the [inaudible]. The court again asked, ''[inaudible]
Center?" Mr. Sili, answered, "Yeah,1'which concluded responses (R. 124:4-5). Thereafter,
the court elicited answers concerning the questionnaire from the rest of the panel and asked
a variety of standard questions designed expose any bias or impartiality (R. 124:5-29).
After the trial court had completed the jury voir dire, prospective jurors #2 and #13
were removed for cause and prospective juror #15 was removed by stipulation of the parties
(R. 76, 124:29). Counsel for defendant and the State then exercised their peremptory
challenges (R. 76). The prosecutor used his second peremptory strike to remove Mr. Sili
from the jury panel (R. 76). Out of the presence of the jury, defendant asserted that the
prosecutor had removed the only minority person on the panel and asked for an explanation
(R. 124:37). When the trial court asked for the prosecutor's reasons, the prosecutor noted
that the court must first rule on whether defendant had made a prima facie case of racial
discrimination before requiring the prosecution to respond (R. 124:37-38). The court
nevertheless insisted on the prosecutor's explanation (R. 124:38).
The prosecutor explained his race neutral reasons as follows:
MR. NIELSEN [Prosecutor]: Thank you. Your Honor, our [inaudible]
explanation is just to note for the Court that No. 3 is not of the same racial
group as the defendant, that based on his answers to the court's voir dire
questions that he didn't appear to fully understand as well as some of the other
jurors and he had difficulty explaining himself, that he is one of the more
undereducated people on the jurors [sic]. I believe it's important for our case
for the jurors to understand what's going on, understand the law. There's
going to be some complicated issues [inaudible] to be decided. I believe that
that would interfere with deliberations and him trying to explain himself or
understand the legal issues involved.
8

(R. 124:38).
Defense counsel disagreed, arguing that the limited voir dire did not provide sufficient
basis to distinguish Mr. Sili from other jurors in the particulars identified by the prosecutor
and that there was nothing to indicate that he would have problems understanding the
proceedings (R. 124:38).
The trial court stated: "The Court would just note in the course - - I'm sure both
counsel noted it - - that the Court on the voir dire that he did not speak clear and the Court
did not understand him. Til just make that comment as far as the race is concerned. Bring
the jury in." At that point, without further discussion, the trial began (R. 124:39).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Defendant has failed to show that the prosecutor's challenge to a jury panel member
belonging to a racial minority was purposeful discrimination. The prosecutor struck the
prospective juror, who had only a high school education, because the prosecutor wanted to
impanel a reasonably well-educated jury and because the prospective juror had difficulty
making himself understood. These reasons are race-neutral. The trial court also found that
the prosecutor's explanation for the strike was not a pretext for discrimination, particularly
because the court itself found the prospective juror difficult to understand.
POINT II
Defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of purchase,

9
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conviction |*2] for possession of a firearm by an illegal
alien, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), contending
that his constitutional rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 90 L Ed. 2d 69, 106 S Ct. 1712 (1986), were
violated by the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge
to remove an African-American from the jury panel.
Specifically, he argues that the district court erred in
crediting the government's proffered race-neutral
explanation for the peremptory challenge. RamirezSoberanes also asserts that the district court erred in
instructing the jury on constructive possession of a firearm,
and that the prosecutor's comments during closing
argument constituted a constructive amendment of the
indictment and impermissibly shifted the burden of proof
to the defense. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND
COUNSEL: For UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff- Appellee: Paul M. Warner, U.S. Attorney, Mark
K. Vincent, Office of the United States Attorney, Salt Lake
City, UT.
For LUIS ALBERTO RAMIREZ-SOBERANES,
Defendant - Appellant: Robert Breeze, Salt Lake City, UT.
JUDGES: Before BRISCOE, ANDERSON, and
LUCERO, Circuit Judges. LUCERO, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
OPINIONBY: Stephen H. Anderson
OPINION:
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

* This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment
may be cited under the terms and conditions of
10th Cir.R. 36.3.
Luis

Alberto

Ramirez-Soberanes

appeals

his

On September 25, 1997, law enforcement officials
executed a search warrant on a Park City, Utah,
condominium, based on information that a suspect named
Carlos was selling cocaine out of the unit. After entering
the condominium, officers ordered the nine Hispanic males
present, including the defendant, to lie face down on [*3]
the floor while officers performed a protective sweep of
the premises. Officers then asked the men if any firearms
were in the apartment. Deputy Sheriff Brad Wilde testified
that defendant responded, "I have a gun, and it's in the
closet." R. Vol. VII at 90. In the closet, police found a .45
caliber semi-automatic handgun, a loaded magazine, and a
box of .45 caliber ammunition. The defendant was taken to
the sheriffs office, where, after waiving his Miranda rights,
he admitted that he was a Mexican citizen, that he was
present in the United States illegally, and that he had
purchased the .45 caliber handgun from a pawn shop
approximately six months before.
On October 2, 1997, a federal grand jury indicted
defendant for possession of a firearm by an illegal alien,
and possession of ammunition by an illegal alien, both in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).
At jury selection, defendant objected to the
prosecution's peremptory strike of Ms. Hannah Brown, an
African-American woman. Upon the objection, the district
court judge and counsel retired to the judge's chambers,
where the prosecutor, Mark Vincent, explained his
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justification for removing Ms. Brown: [*4]

THE COURT: The reason-she works at
McDonald's and you find that significant is
what?

objected to proposed Instruction No. 19, arguing that it
inadequately defined constructive possession, and
suggested that the court instead adopt the definition
contained in United States v. Mills, which stated that "[a]
person has constructive possession when he or she
knowingly holds ownership, dominion, or control over the
object and the premises where it is found." 29 F.3d 545,
549 (10th Cir. 1994). After reviewing Mills, the court [*6]
agreed that it set forth the proper definition of constructive
possession, and made several attempts at rephrasing the
instruction to conform to the Mills language. Due to some
apparent confusion about how the instruction would read,
the court then stated:

MR. VINCENT: Nothing more than they
have a tendency in fast-food restaurants to
deal with-in lot of areas minority groups,
legals, illegals. There may be some
sympathies that are there one way or the
other. And just to eliminate any sense of
prejudice one way or the other, we felt that
it was appropriate to strike her.

I'll tell you what. Let me have [the clerk]
type it up, and then I will go over
[instruction number] 19 with you again at
our next break. . . . I'll make a copy of the
19 for you so that we make sure that we're
all on the same track, and we'll go over it
one more time before instructing the jury,
okay?

R. Vol. VII at 49. In restating his grounds for the
peremptory challenge, Mr. Vincent explained:

R. Vol. VII at 151. After the change was made, the court
read the amended instruction to both counsel. Though the
amended instruction omitted some of the Mills language,
defendant's counsel accepted the instruction without
objection. Copies of the final instructions were given to
both counsel, and neither party objected to any of the
instructions when they were subsequently presented to the
jury.

MR. VINCENT: The reason is her place of
employment; has nothing to do with her
ethnic background.
THE COURT: Where does she work?
MR. VINCENT: She works at McDonald's.

Well, I'm not prejudiced against her for
being black. . . . If she was white, if she
was Hispanic, if she was any other
ethnicity, it is my experience that people
who work at McDonald's have a lot of
dealings with a large group of people,
including aliens. And I don't know if there's
any sympathies one way or the other, but
because there is a propensity for her to have
dealings with a large group of people, that
may or may not have prejudiced her. I don't
know. I just feel that it's [*5] sufficient.
Id. at 50. To support his assertion that he had not removed
Ms. Brown because of her race, Mr. Vincent emphasized
that he had not used peremptory challenges to remove two
Hispanic jurors from the venire.
After listening to Mr. Vincent's explanation, the
district court accepted his proffered reason, stating: "Mr.
Vincent has given an answer that I think satisfies Batson.
He says that in his experience people who work at
McDonald's might have some personal experiences that
might, and I think he said, either way affect their ability to
be impartial." Id. Ms. Brown was excused from the jury.
At the conclusion of trial, the district court discussed
the proposed jury instructions with counsel. Defendant

In his closing argument, Mr. Vincent reviewed the
evidence, arguing that the government had proven each
element of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. With
respect to defendant's possession of the gun, he told [*7]
the jury that "to possess means to have something within
your control," R. Vol. VII at 179, and suggested that the
defendant first possessed the gun when he purchased it on
March 15, 1997. He then stated: "We have not heard any
evidence that that firearm was ever sold, was ever given,
was ever transferred to any other individual in this case."
Id. Upon objection by defense counsel, the court
admonished the jury that "the burden is always on the
government to prove its case. The defendant does not have
to do anything. The defendant does not have to contest
evidence." Id.
Mr. Vincent continued with his argument that
defendant had possessed the gun both when he purchased
it on March 15, and at the time of the search, on September
25. He stated to the jury that "either of those dates works"
because the indictment charged that "on or about
September 25,1997," defendant had possessed the firearm,
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and that "within reason, and within six months, that is
reasonable." Id. at 184.
Defendant did not object to this argument, though he
vigorously contested it in his own closing argument, telling
the jury that the indictment's charge could not be stretched
to cover defendant's possession [*8] at the time of the
March 15 purchase. He argued that if the government had
wanted to prove the March 15 possession, it should have
charged the offense as a March 15 possession. Defendant
argued that the government had failed to prove that he had
possessed either the gun or the ammunition on September
25, 1997.

analysis, arguing that the prosecutor's articulated reason for
[*10] striking Ms. Brown was not race neutral. A neutral
explanation is one "based on something other than the race
of the juror," n2 and "unless a discriminatory intent is
inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered
will be deemed race neutral." Hernandez v. New York, 500
U.S. 352, 360, 114 L. Ed. 2d395, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
The proffered reason need not be "persuasive, or even
plausible," so long as it is facially valid. Purkett v. Elem,
514 U.S. 765, 768, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834, 115 S Ct. 1769
(1995).

In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor focused
entirely on the September 25 search, arguing that
defendant's own statements made during the search
demonstrated that he held control and dominion over the
gun at that time. He then stated that "ownership, although
isn't conclusive of possession, it goes a long ways to say
that you have possession of something, you have dominion
and control." R. Vol. VII at 195.

nl While the district court made no
preliminary finding that defendant had made a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, this
preliminary issue becomes moot once the
prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation
for peremptory challenges, and the district court
has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional
discrimination. See Hernandez v. New York, 500
US. 352, 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 111 S. Ct. 1859
(1991).

The jury found defendant guilty of possession of a
firearm by an illegal alien, but acquitted him of the
possession of ammunition charge.

n2 The dissent defines a race neutral reason as
"a reason other than race," relying on part of a
sentence from Hernandez. 500 US. at 371.
However, both the plurality and concurring
opinions in Hernandez make clear that the focus of
the Batson analysis is the race of the juror. See id.
at 359 ("A neutral explanation in the context of our
analysis here means an explanation based on
something other than the race of the juror.")
(Kennedy, J., plurality) (emphasis added); id. at
373 ("Consistent with our established equal
protection jurisprudence, a peremptory strike will
constitute a Batson violation only if the prosecutor
struck a juror because of the juror's race.")
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

DISCUSSION
I. Peremptory Challenge
Defendant first argues that the district court erred in
allowing the prosecutor to remove Ms. Brown from the
jury panel. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed.
2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), the Supreme Court held that
the Constitution prohibits a prosecutor from [*9] using a
peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror on account
of her race. Under the three-step procedure set forth in
Batson, a defendant must first make a prima facie showing
of purposeful racial discrimination in the selection of the
jury. See id. at 96. "Once the defendant makes a prima
facie showing, the burden shifts to the [prosecution] to
come forward with a neutral explanation" for the
peremptory challenge. Id. at 97. If the court concludes that
the prosecution's articulated reason is race neutral, it must
then determine whether the defendant has carried his
burden of proving purposeful discrimination. See id. The
question of whether a proffered explanation is race neutral
is a matter of law we review de novo, see United States v.
Sneed, 34 F.3d 1570, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994), while the
ultimate question of whether intentional discrimination
occurred is a question of fact we review under the clearly
erroneous standard, see United States v. Davis, 40 F.Sd
1069, 1077 (10th Cir. 1994).
Defendant focuses on step two nl of the Batson

[Ml]
Here, the prosecutor asserted that he struck Ms. Brown
from the venire because she worked at McDonald's, and
that, in his experience, persons who work in fast-food
restaurants might have sympathies or prejudices for or
against minorities or aliens. Defendant does not seriously
contest the government's assertion that it also would have
struck a white McDonald's employee, an assertion
supported by the district court's finding. Essentially,
defendant argues that under Batson, no juror can be struck
for suspected bias favorable to co-workers or customers
with whom the juror is in close daily contact, if the coworkers or customers are members of a minority group. We
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are not persuaded that Batson and Hernandez go that far.
Federal courts have consistently upheld peremptory
challenges based upon the employment of the juror. See
United States v. Alvarado, 951 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1991)
(allowing peremptory strike because juror was a social
worker); United States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103 (4th Cir.
1989) (current and past employment are legitimate raceneutral grounds for peremptory strikes); United States v.
Johnson, 905 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1990) [*12] (allowing
peremptory strike where juror worked for state family
services agency); United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102
(10th Cir. 1991) (allowing peremptory challenge where
juror worked as Legal Aid secretary). Each of these
explanations is race neutral because it is "based on
something other than the race of the juror." Hernandez,
500 U.S. at 360. n3

n3 In the two cases defendant cites on this
issue, the prosecutors' articulated reasons for
exercising peremptory challenges were based, at
least in part, upon the race of the juror. See United
States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1121, 1124 (8th Cir.
1989); Thompson v. Florida, 548 So. 2d 198, 202
(Fla. 1989). Hence, because the reason given in the
present case was based on the juror's employment,
the cited cases are inapposite to our analysis. We
recognize that the Ninth Circuit, in United States v.
Bishop, 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992), found the
government's strike of a black juror because she
lived in a high-crime neighborhood to be an
impermissible surrogate for racial bias. However,
that case and similar state cases are distinguishable
from this case on their facts and, in any event, do
not control our decision.

n4 Contrary to the dissent's assertion, the
holding in this case does not extend beyond the
place of employment, as the text makes clear.
n5 Indeed, the defense in this case could have
exercised a peremptory challenge to remove a
McDonald's worker from the jury pool, on the
theory that his or her workplace associations may
have produced an anti-minority bias.
1*14]
Of course, the trial court is not obligated to believe the
reason given by the prosecution. If it concludes that the
juror was actually struck because of his or her race, it may
reject the government's proffered reason as pretextual.
However, the question of whether a prosecutor's
explanation is merely a pretext for racial bias should be
addressed in step three of the Batson analysis, see Purkett,
514 U.S. at 768; at the second stage "the issue is the facial
validity of the prosecutor's explanation." Hernandez, 500
U.S. at 360. In the present case, after the prosecutor
articulated his race-neutral reason for striking Ms. Brown,
and after defendant offered his counter argument, the
district court accepted the prosecutor's explanation.
Because this decision rests primarily on credibility
determinations, we give great deference to the district
court's findings. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21. In
reviewing the record, we find no clear error.
In sum, we hold that, as a matter of law, the prosecutor
offered a race-neutral explanation for his peremptory strike
of Ms. Brown, and that the district court did not err in its
ultimate conclusion [*15] that the defendant failed to
prove purposeful racial discrimination.
II. Jury Instructions
The indictment charged that

[*13]
When reviewing peremptory challenges, "we must
keep firmly in mind that Batson's holding rests squarely on
the Equal Protection Clause." United States v. Uwaezhoke,
995F.2d388, 393 (3d Cir. 1992). In the context of Bat son,
the Equal Protection Clause does not protect an individual
from being removed from a jury because of the particular
viewpoints she is suspected of holding; it only prohibits the
removal of a juror for viewpoints attributed to the juror
because of her race. Where a prosecutor alleges that an
individual may have acquired sympathies or prejudices
through her employment, n4 and not simply because she
shares the race of the defendant, the prosecutor has
articulated a race-neutral explanation. n5

on or about September 25, 1997, in the
Central Division of the District of Utah,
Luis Alberto Ramirez-Soberanes, the
defendant herein, then being an alien
illegally and unlawfully in the United States
of America, did knowingly possess in and
affecting interstate commerce a firearm . . .
in violation of Title 18, United States Code
§ 922(g)(5).

Indictment at 1-2, R. Vol. I, Doc. 10. In a § 922(g) case,
the government may prove possession that is either actual
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or constructive. See United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d
1528, 1533 (10th Cir. 1989). On this requirement, the
district court instructed the jury as follows: "If you find
that the defendant either had actual possession or had
ownership, dominion, or control over the firearm, even
though it may have been in the physical possession of
another, you may find that the government has proved
possession." Instruction No. 19, R. Vol. I, Doc. 91.
Defendant contends that, under Mills, constructive
possession occurs only when a person "knowingly holds
[*16] ownership, dominion, or control over the object and
the premises where it is found," 29 FJdat 549 (emphasis
added), and that the district court erred by omitting the
words "and the premises where it is found" from the
instruction.
Because defendant did not object to the instruction
given, we review for plain error only. See United States v.
Fabiano, 169 F 3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999). However,
we note that the standard of review does not control our
decision, as we conclude that, under any standard, the
omission of the words "and the premises where it is found"
was not erroneous.
In United States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 87 9 (10th Cir.
1987), we reaffirmed a twenty-year-old holding that a
person has constructive possession of an item when he
"knowingly holds the power and ability to exercise
dominion and control over it." Id. at 881 (citing United
States v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1354 (10th Cir. 1982);
United States v. link, 612F.2d511, 516 (10th Cir. 1980);
Amaya v. United States, 373 F2d 197, 199 (10th Cir.
1967)). We restated the "dominion and control over [*17]
the item" rule in United States v. Parrish, 925 F.2d 1293,
1296 (10th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by
United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453 (10th Cir. 1996),
and added that, in some instances, "exercising dominion
and control over a residence where contraband is concealed
may constitute constructive possession of the narcotics."
Id.
After Parrish, a panel of this circuit stated that
"generally, a person has constructive possession of
narcotics if he knowingly has ownership, dominion or
control over the narcotics and the premises where the
narcotics are found." United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d
883, 888 (10th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added), abrogated on
other grounds by Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137,
133 L. Ed. 2d 472, 116 S Ct. 501 (1995). For this
proposition, the Hager panel cited only Parrish. However,
in suggesting a two-part test that lists in the conjunctive the
requirements that a person have ownership, dominion or
control over the contraband and over the premises where it
is found, Hager departed from both Parrish and the

constructive possession standards [*18] of other circuits
that use similar language but list the factors in the
disjunctive. n6

n6 See, e.g., United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d
106, 107 (4th Cir. 1992) (constructive possession
when evidence shows "ownership, dominion, or
control over the contraband itself or the premises or
vehicle in which the contraband is concealed")
(emphasis added); United States v. McKnight, 953
F.2d 898, 901 (5th Cir. 1992) (constructive
possession when evidence shows "ownership,
dominion, or control over the contraband itself or
over the premises in which the contraband is
located") (emphasis added); United States v.
Wainwright, 921 F2d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 1990)
(constructive possession over contraband when
evidence shows "ownership, dominion or control
over the contraband itself, or dominion over the
premises in which the contraband is concealed")
(emphasis added).
Since Hager, many of our cases (including the Mills
case cited by defendant) have [*19J repeated this general
statement, although none of them have been decided based
on a conjunctive requirements of dominion over an item
and the premises. However, in other recent cases, we have
cited the Culpepper definition, finding constructive
possession where the defendant has the power to exercise
control and dominion over the item alone. See, e.g., United
States v. Sullivan, 919 F2d 1403, 1430 (10th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Simpson, 94 F.3d 1373, 1380 (10th Cir.
1996). In any event, Culpepper is the law in this circuit;
therefore, constructive possession exists where the
defendant has the power to exercise control or dominion
over the item. See 834 F.2d at 881. Control or dominion
over the premises where the item is found is therefore a
factor, see Parrish, 925 F.2d at 1296, but not a
requirement, for finding constructive possession of the
item itself. Accordingly, the district court's omission of the
words "and the premises where it is found," whether
intentional or accidental, was not error.
Defendant also complains that, under the instruction
given, mere ownership of the gun would be sufficient [*20]
to constitute constructive possession. However, defendant
did not make this specific objection in any of the
discussions of the jury instructions. Accordingly, we will
not reverse unless the district court committed plain error.
See Fabiano, 169 F.3d at 1302. Such an error must be
obvious and affect the defendant's substantial rights. See
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731, 123 L. Ed. 2d
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508, 113 S Ct. 1770 (1993). We see no obvious error in
the district court's instruction, and furthermore, see nothing
that "'seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.'" United States v.
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1, 105 S. Ct. 1038
(1985) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157,
160, 80 L. Ed. 555, 56 S. Ct. 391 (1936)). Accordingly, we
find no plain error.
III. Constructive Amendment
Defendant next contends that the prosecutor's
statements in closing argument, where he told the jury that
possession on either March 15 or September 25 was
sufficient for conviction, constructively amended the
indictment and allowed the jury to convict him for
possessing the [*21] gun on a date not charged in the
indictment. We disagree.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the Fifth
Amendment does not "permit a defendant to be tried on
charges that are not made in the indictment." Stir one v.
United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217, 4L. Ed. 2d 252, 80S. Ct.
270 (1960). A constructive amendment occurs when the
evidence presented, together with the jury instructions,
raises a substantial likelihood that the defendant was
convicted of an offense other than that charged in the
indictment, United States v. Hornung, 848F. 2d1040,1046
(10th Cir. 1998), and requires reversal per se.
Even if we assume that the March 15 possession was
a different offense than the "on or about September 25"
possession charged in the indictment, we conclude that
there is no substantial likelihood that the jury convicted
defendant for his March 15 purchase. The court's
instructions to the jury properly limited the charges on
which defendant could be convicted to those occurring "on
or about September 25." Instruction No. 17, R. Vol. I, Doc.
91. In its opening charge, the court instructed the jury that
"the statements, the arguments, the objections by the [*22]
attorneys are not evidence" and that they "must not
consider them." R. Vol. VII at 53. In its final instructions,
the court instructed the jury that if any difference appears
between the law as stated by counsel and that stated by the
court in its instructions, the instructions govern. See
Instruction No. 1, R. Vol. I, Doc. 91. We must presume
that the jurors remained loyal to their oaths and
conscientiously followed the district court's instructions.
See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9, 85 L. Ed.
2d 344, 105 S. Ct. 1965 (1985). Furthermore, the
prosecutor's rebuttal argument focused entirely on the
evidence of defendant's September 25 constructive
possession.
Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutor's stray

comments during closing argument did not constructively
amend the indictment. Cf. United States v. Williams, 106
F.3d 1173, 1176 (4th Cir. 1997) (no impermissible
amendment when indictment alleged distribution of
methamphetamine and prosecutor's closing argument
indicated that admission to distribution of marijuana
proved guilt, because jury instructed that closing argument
not evidence); United States v. Russo, 708F2d209, 21214 (6th Cir. 1983) [*23] (no impermissible amendment of
indictment charging extortion by threats of economic loss
when evidence introduced at trial demonstrated extortion
by threats or fear of violence because jury instructions
clearly limited charge to extortion by threat of economic
loss).
IV. Burden Shifting
Defendant's final contention is that the prosecutor's
comments in closing argument impermissibly shifted the
burden of proof to the defense. In reviewing the
prosecutor's remarks, we think they are more properly
characterized as an attempt to summarize the evidence and
comment on its probative value. However, even assuming
arguendo that the prosecutor's comments implied a burden
shift, the district court immediately gave a curative
instruction that was accurate and straightforward. The
prosecutor's closing arguments did not deprive defendant
of a fair trial. See United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571,
595-96 (10th Cir. 1984).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment
of the district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
CONCURBY: LUCERO (In Part)
DISSENTBY: LUCERO (In Part)
DISSENT: LUCERO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part
[*24] and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion except as to the
Batson claim. As to that issue, because the prosecution's
proffered reason for its peremptory challenge is expressly
race-based, I dissent. Batson and its progeny clearly
disallow the result reached today.
"[A] race-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge
means a reason other than race." Hernandez, 500 U.S. at
371. In the present case, the prosecution proffered an
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explicitly race-based explanation for its peremptory
challenge against venireperson Brown, an African
American:

She works at McDonald's
. . . .
[McDonald's employees] have a tendency
in fast-food restaurants to deal with-in lot
of areas minority groups, legals, illegals.
There may be some sympathies that are
there one way or the other.
(VII R. at 49.) The record demonstrates that appellant is a
member of a racial minority. I simply cannot read the
prosecution's comment as being race-neutral and thus
conclude the trial court's decision violates Batson.
Hernandez, involving a peremptory challenge to
venirepersons because of their language skills, holds that
any race-neutral reason meets the prosecution's |*25]
second-step burden. This case, by contrast, simply does not
involve a race-neutral reason. n7 In United States v.
Bishop, 959 F.2d820, 825-26 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth
Circuit holds unconstitutional a peremptory challenge
based on a venireperson's "sympathy for minorities" arising
from her residence in a minority neighborhood. Bishop
declares the prosecutor's proffered reason "amounted to
little more than the assumption that one who lives in an
area heavily populated by poor black people could not
fairly try a black defendant." Id. at 825. Contrary to the
majority's contention, Bishop struck down the same reason
the prosecution proffered in the instant case—"sympathy
for minorities"-and thus is not distinguishable on its facts.
With its holding today, the majority creates a circuit split
in this area of Batson jurisprudence.

n7 This case is also easily distinguishable from
the other cases cited by the majority in support of
the constitutionality of "peremptory challenges
based upon the employment of the juror." (Maj.
Order at 9.) None of those cases uphold
peremptory challenges for which a party proffered
a race-based reason.

1*26]
Most importantly, I am troubled by the short shrift the
majority opinion accords to the core constitutional
concerns underlying Batson. The instant case differs
factually from Batson only in that the prosecution has
challenged the venireperson, an African American, because
of her sympathies for minorities, not because she is herself
a minority. That factual difference does not render the
government's explanation constitutionally acceptable. See
Bishop, 959F.2dat825-26. Under the majority's approach,
Batson is stripped of all practical significance: To justify
the exercise of peremptory challenges, parties seeking to
exclude minority venirepersons from juries, in deliberate
contravention of the Supreme Court's Batson
jurisprudence, henceforth need offer only "sympathy for
minorities," by virtue of residence, family connections, or
place of employment, as a transparent proxy for
venirepersons' race, thereby eviscerating '"the very idea of
a jury . . . composed of the peers or equals of the
[defendant]; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, [and]
associates.'" Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 (quoting Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308, 25 L. Ed. 664 (1879))
[*27] (further citation omitted). n8

n8 That is not to say that the principle of
Batson race-neutrality need be taken to absurd
extremes, for example, to prohibit the striking of a
venireperson who professes the intent to nullify
with respect to minority jurors. Cf. Heno v.
Sprint/UnitedManagment Co., 208F.3d847, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 6124 (10th Cir. 2000) (slip op.)
(Seymour, Chief Circuit Judge, concurring)
(discussing the scope of the constitutional concerns
underlying Batson and Hernandez). But we do not
face that situation in the present case, in which
there is no allegation that venireperson Brown had
any such intention.
I would remand for a new trial.

